Snapshots in Life
Globalization 2011, Share my snapshots of life, with travel & sharing as the spirit moves. "...Daily we change, and the snapshots that others have of us mark the periods in our lives,,,"
Thursday, February 25, 2021
Thursday, February 11, 2021
Lutheran circles have talked and written about the Issue of Reparations in the Past, This is a portion of an article in Lutheran Quarterly, August 1975 [I have had difficulty scanning and editing for sharing on my blog and in this Facebook forum. given those difficulties in the last 48 hours, I am not able to spend any more time in making it letter perfect. It is missing pages 214-219
Justice and Reparations:
The Black Manifesto Reconsidered By MERLE
LONGWOOD
Merle Longwood is Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at Siena College, Loudonville, N.Y.
C |
ONTEMPORARY discussions
concerning "quotas" or "affirmative action" programs raise
significant issues about the meaning of" justice" in our common life.
Some have argued that "simple justice" requires that blacks and women
be given preferential treatment in employment and educational opportunities,
because blacks and women have been "unjustly" excluded from
participation in these areas. Others have countered that such "reverse
discrimination" cannot be morally justified and that giving preferential
treatment to blacks and women would undermine justice, law, equality and the
very foundations of our political society.
To provide some perspective on this debate, perhaps it would be
helpful to examine carefully the argument for compensatory justice and
reparations set forth in one of the most important documents of the
contemporary liberation movement in America, the Black
Manifesto. Let us first briefly recall the context within
which that manifesto emerged and the responses it provoked in the nation's churches and
synagogues.
It was immediately after May 4, 1969 that the news media across
the
nation
recorded the shocked reactions
of the white religious establishment to the interruption of a Sunday morning
communion service at Riverside Church in New York by James Forman, a
black militant leader. On that date, Forman read the Black Manifesto-which had
been adopted at a three-day National Black Economic Development Conference (NBEDC),
sponsored by the Interreligious
Foundation for
Community Organization (IFCO) in Detroit a week earlier and presented demands for that
congregation's share of the $500 million in reparations to black people that
the manifesto stipulated white Christian churches and Jewish synagogues should pay. Although
Forman had presented the manifesto, without specifying precise demands, to Episcopal
Church leaders and the policy-making General Board of the National Council of Churches several days earlier, few Americans
had heard of the Black Manifesto or its demands for reparations until
the
dramatic,
disruptive event at the famous interdenominational church in Manhattan made front-page news from
coast to coast.
The manifesto was
subsequently presented to several other Protestant, Catholic and Jewish groups, though Forman
himself did not continue the practice of personally interrupting worship
services. In fact, in most instances in
which Forman delivered the manifesto’s demands, the occasions were carefully
prearranged. However, there were
disruptions at other places: denominational offices and church facilities in
many cities were taken over temporarily by local groups—not always clearly
identified with NBEDC—to underscore their specific demands. On June 13, two months after the Riverside
event, Forman revised the total amount upward to $3 billion in reparations to
be raised by white churches and synagogues.[i][ii]
RESPONSES To THE
MANIFESTO
Most of us probably remember the manifesto most clearly by the controversy stirred by the radical (sometimes
revolutionary,) rhetoric it contained, particularly in the introduction, which was titled: "Total Control as the Only Solution to the Economic Problems of Black People." There Forman claimed that "racism in the U.S. is so pervasive in the mentality' of whites that only an armed, well-disciplined, black-controlled government can insure the stamping out of
racism in this country" and that "we must commit ourselves to a
society where the total means of production are
taken from the rich and placed into the hands of the state for the welfare of all the people.”[iii] Reactions by individuals and religious
organizations tended to focus upon those comments and other similar statements scattered throughout the
introduction. There was very little direct response or careful analysis of the central argument in the text of the manifest03-a demand of $500 million ("15 dollars per nigger," in Forman's words) in reparations from the white
religious organizations to be used for: the establishment of a southern land bank, four
publishing and printing industries, four television networks in four cities, centers for community organizing and communications training, assistance for the
National Welfare Rights Organization, a National Black Labor Strike and Defense
Fund, an International Black Appeal to establish cooperative black businesses, a black university in the South and an allocation of funds from IFCO to
implement the manifesto's demands.
[1] For Forman's own account of the Black Manifesto, see his The Making of Black Revolutionaries (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972), pp. 543-50. Additional accounts of the presentation of the manifesto are contained in Arnold Schuchter, Reparations: The Black Manifesto and Its Challenge to White America (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1970), pp. 2-27 and Robert S. Lecky and H. Elliott Wright, eds.,Black Manifesto: Religion, Racism and Repara-
tions (New York: Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1969), pp. 1-33. Extended coverage of the manifesto and responses to it was also provided by the New York Times in the following issues in 1969: May 5, pp.1,37; May 6, pp. 1,36,37; May 18, pp. 30, 80; May 22, pp. 1,39; May 23, p. 24; May 25, p. 66; June 30, p. 30; July 7, p. 18; July 27, pp. 1,54; September 15, pp. 1,51; September 27, p. 36; November 14, p. 35; December 21, Part IV, p. 13.
2 The text of the Black Manifesto is available in a number of published versions. The citations
here are from the version printed as Appendix 1 in Lecky and Wright, pp. 11
[1] My concern in this essay is not to
try to summarize all the responses of the various religious organizations to
the manifesto; rather, I shall suggest
that a basic perspective informed almost all of them and that the perspective failed to
accept or even address the argument of the manifesto
on its own grounds. Before moving to that discussion, however, it may be helpful to illustrate the general reaction to the manifesto by selecting some
representative comments.
By and large, Jewish and Catholic organizations rejected the manifesto out
of hand. The American Jewish Committee officially withdrew from IFCO because in
the committee's opinion I FCO refused to take a "clear stand as to where it stood on
the matter of the ideology of the Black Manifesto with its call to guerilla
warfare and resort to arms to bring down the government."! The Synagogue Council of America, representing all branches of
American Judaism, and the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, composed of most of the Jewish
civic and humanitarian organizations, rejected both the substantive demands of
the manifesto and the tactics used to present the
demands "on both moral and practical grounds.”5 The Rabbinical Council of America, an Orthodox group, rejected the manifesto's demands"
categorically," explaining that "just as we have the responsibility to combat white
racism, so do we have the equal responsibility to combat black racism which tries-consciously or unconsciously-to perpetuate black racism. "6
The response of the Archdiocese of
New York was typical of---even if more harsh than most-official Roman Catholic reaction to the
manifesto. Its statement rejecting the manifesto emphasized that it was" regrettable"
that the manifesto related its concerns through "political concepts which are completely
contrary to our American way of life,"7 and went on to enumerate the numerous programs the archdiocese
was providing for
poor and black
people. (Commonweal later editorialized that the archdiocese could
surely have done better than to point to its charities and educational expenditures.8)
Responses from Protestant church bodies
were more varied. Almost all rejected the manifesto, but some did so by pointing to already existing programs organized to
combat racism or poverty, whereas others did organize some new programs for black development. The Southern Baptist Convention, though not a direct recipient of manifesto demands, nevertheless approved a statement
condemning the Black Manifesto:
The Council of the American Lutheran Church was almost as vehement in its
rejection, objecting to the manifesto's “strong, course, inflammatory language;”10 but it promised to begin an aggressive
program to focus on racism and poverty.
which advocated the use of violence as part of its program." A resolution was adopted which rejected "much of the ideology of the' Black Manifesto' " but recognized NBEDC as a movement which is an "expression of self-determination for the organizing of the black community in America." Though money raised through this special fund eventually was channeled to NBEDC, the leaders of the church took pains to insist that the church's action should not be interpreted as a response to the manifesto. A
accept or even address the argument of the manifesto
on its own grounds. Before moving to that discussion, however, it may be helpful to illustrate the general reaction to the manifesto by selecting some
representative comments.
By and large, Jewish and Catholic organizations rejected the manifesto out
of hand. The American Jewish Committee officially withdrew from IFCO because in
the committee's opinion I FCO refused to take a "clear stand as to where it stood on
the matter of the ideology of the Black Manifesto with its call to guerilla
warfare and resort to arms to bring down the government."! The Synagogue Council of America, representing all branches of
American Judaism, and the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, composed of most of the Jewish
civic and humanitarian organizations, rejected both the substantive demands of
the manifesto and the tactics used to present the
demands "on both moral and practical grounds.”5 The Rabbinical Council of America, an Orthodox group, rejected the manifesto's demands"
categorically," explaining that "just as we have the responsibility to combat white
racism, so do we have the equal responsibility to combat black racism which tries-consciously or unconsciously-to perpetuate black racism. "6
The response of the Archdiocese of
New York was typical of---even if more harsh than most-official Roman Catholic reaction to the
manifesto. Its statement rejecting the manifesto emphasized that it was" regrettable"
that the manifesto related its concerns through "political concepts which are completely
contrary to our American way of life,"7 and went on to enumerate the numerous programs the archdiocese
was providing for
poor and black
people. (Commonweal later editorialized that the archdiocese could
surely have done better than to point to its charities and educational expenditures.8)
Responses from Protestant church bodies
were more varied. Almost all rejected the manifesto, but some did so by pointing to already existing programs organized to
combat racism or poverty, whereas others did organize some new programs for black development. The Southern Baptist Convention, though not a direct recipient of manifesto demands, nevertheless approved a statement
condemning the Black Manifesto:
The Council of the American Lutheran Church was almost as vehement in its
rejection, objecting to the manifesto's “strong, course, inflammatory language;”10 but it promised to begin an aggressive
program to focus on racism and poverty.
The Episcopal Church, at a
special general convention, adopted a compromise measure calling for the
raising of $200,000 for the National Committee of Black Churchmen (NCBC), an
interdenominational group of black clergymen, rather than for NBEDC, and made special reference to a 1967 funding
criterion which refused to allow funds to go to "any individual or group
which advocated the use of violence as part of its program." A resolution
was adopted which rejected "much of the ideology of the' Black Manifesto' " but recognized NBEDC as a movement which is an "expression of
self-determination for the
organizing of the black community in America." Though money raised through this special fund eventually was channeled to NBEDC, the leaders of the church
took pains to insist that the church's action should not be interpreted
as a response to the manifesto. A press release announcing
the voluntary offering to raise money for the fund made this clear. It read, in
part: "This fund should not be considered a response to the Black
Manifesto, nor an acceptance of the concept of reparations. Rather, it was understood as an expression of trust in the black leadership of the church.”11
The closest any Protestant
national body came to endorsing the
manifesto was the statement issued by the General Board of the National Council of Churches, which is not, of course, a denomination but an agency serving its member churches. The Board, while "rejecting the ideology of the Black Manifesto,"
declared that it was" aware of the grievances of the
black people of this nation" and "acknowledges the Black
Economic Development Conference as a
programmatic expression of the aspirations of black churchmen." The Board also voted to ask its 33 member denominations to raise $500 million and to give it,
without condition as to its use, to NCBC and IFCO.12
Although many individual
churchmen (especially black church-men), a Catholic group of lay people,
several ad hoc groups and at least one congregation endorsed the demand
for reparations as a just means for compensating blacks for
discrimination inflicted in the past,13 almost all the churches-especially at
official or national denominational levels-rejected the idea of reparations as
an appropriate moral justification for providing remedies to combat racism or
poverty afflicting black people. Before I attempt to make
9 Christian Century 86 (July 16,1969), p. 961.
10 Christian Century 87 (February
11,1970), p. 186.
11 Christian Century 86
(October I, 1969), pp. 1262-64. For
additional accounts of the response
of the Episcopal Church see Judy M. Foley, "Dealing with a Manifesto," The Episcopalian 134
(July, 1969), pp. 11-12, and David Owen,
"A Tale of Two Conferences-Part II," Renewal 9 (September-October, 1969), pp. 20-21.
12 Christian Century 86 (October
1,1969), p. 1239.
13 Christian Century 87
(February 11, 1970), pp. 186-88; New York Times, July 7, 1969, p. 18;
New York Times, June 10, 1970, pp. 49, 74.
some generalizations about the responses of the churches, however, it might be appropriate to
reconstruct the argument of the manifesto, for it is the merits of that
argument which must be appraised if we are going to attempt to view the
manifesto as having more than momentary significance.
THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT
OF THE MANIFESTO
It is clear to any reader
of the manifesto that its central argument is not easy to separate from the more
peripheral issues in the document. The argument is intertwined with revolutionary rhetoric, remarks expressing
passionate indignation, posturing threats to the white community, generalized predictions about the future of America and the world and a
brief sketch of how the reparation monies would be used once they are secured,
Therefore, it is necessary to concentrate on some of the most essential points
in order not to be confused or distracted from the basic ethical argument
justifying reparations to black people, The reconstructed argument below contains some premises drawn directly from the text of the manifesto-either 'as precise
quotations or paraphrases-and some premises which are interpolations of what
seem to be the tacit assumptions underlying some of the explicit assertions in
the text of the
document.14
l. In the early history of
slavery, blacks were wrenched from a" continent of peace" and brought
into" a hostile and alien environment" where they" have been
living in perpetual warfare since 1619" (p. 119),
2. The result has been
that blacks have suffered enormously" from racism and exploitation, cultural degradation and lack of
political power," all of which was caused by and is perpetuated by the
white capitalistic power structure (pp. 114, 116-17).
3, The white Christian
churches and Jewish synagogues are "part and parcel of the system of
capitalism" -in fact, they are" another form of government in this
country" -and as such they have actively exploited and continue to be used by a
government to exploit non-white people throughout the world (pp, 118,
119,120,125).15
4. The black people in
America are "the vanguard force" among exploited people now seeking
to throw off their oppressors (p, 116).
5. American blacks are the
legitimate heirs of the original victims of slavery in this country, and as such they can include in their heritage the harm and injury suffered by their parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, etc.
14 In developing this reconstruction of the
argument of the Black Manifesto, I am indebted to Hugo A. Bedau, "Compensatory Justice
and the Black Manifesto," The Monist 20 (1972), pp. 20-42.
The page references are to the version of the manifesto published in Lecky and Wright. Where no page references occur, the premises are my own
interpolations.
15 The ways in which the western missionary
movement has been inadvertently coupled with the economic, industrial, cultural and political
expansion of modern Europe and America into all parts of the world is examined
by Daisuke Kitagawa in ..'Racial' Man in the Modern World," in Man in Community, ed. Egbert deVries (New
York: Association Press, 1966), pp. 140-52.
6. The present existing
white religious organizations, which
affirm their historical identification with
their forebears, are liable'" to
present living blacks
for the harm inflicted by the historical
religious
organizations upon blacks in the past.
7. Historical
slavery and its continuing aftermath of institu-tional
racism had and
has as one of its primary aims"
developing the industrial base of the western world," particularly
the United States, which is "the most
industrialized country in the world"
(pp. 118, 125, 119).17
8. The wealth exacted by this systemic exploitation
has been fantastic; it amounts
to billions of dollars. 18
9. Much of this
tremendous wealth has
directly benefited
white religious organizations,
"the white Christian churches
and synagogues," or their
individual members (p. 120).
10. By way of contrast, almost none of this wealth benefited
those who were exploited over the centuries; they were denied the fruits of their labor.
11. This wealth has
accumulated through the profits of an
unjust, exploitative system, and consequently it represents an unjust enrichment's for white America.
16 Bedau, pp. 27-69, distinguishes
"liability" from "guilt." The latter suggests a context in
which punitive sanctions are appropriate, whereas the former involves responsibility but not a
punitive remedy. For a more extended discussion of the
difference between "guilt" and "liability," and the need to confine corporate responsibility to the latter, see Joel Feinberg,
"Collective Responsibility," in
his Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp.
231-33.
17 Historians are divided in
their opinions about how profitable the institution
of slavery was in its contribution
to the economic development of
this country. A sample of
this discussion can be found in Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (New York: Capicorn Books, 1966) and Robert S. Starobin, Industrial
Slavery in the Old South (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1970). Stanley M.
Elkins also addresses this question in Appendix B of his
excellent study, Slavery (2nd ed., Chicago
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1969). For an analysis of the continuing effects of
racism and
discrimination in relation to poverty, see Lester C. Thurow, Poverty and
Discrimination (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1969).
18 There have been a
number of attempts in recent years to
calculate the economic value of the labor supplied by black slaves to the development of
America's economy. See especially the contributions by Richard America, Brian G. M. McMain, Jim
Marketti and Robert S. Browne
to a collection of essays devoted to" reparations" in Review of Black Political Economy
2 (Winter,1972)
Other significant discussions of the economics of
slavery are: Alfred H. Conrad and John R. Meyer, "The Economics of Slavery in the Ante-Bellum
South," Journal of Political Economy 66 (April,1958); pp. 95-130; T. W. Schultz, "Investment in
Human Capital," American Economic Review 51(March, 1961), pp. 1-17; Gary S. Becker, "Investments
in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of
Political Economy 70 (October, 1962), Supplement 70, pp. 9-49;Julian Simon and Larry Neal," A Calculation
of the Black Reparations Bill," Review of Black
Political Economy 4 (Winter, 1974), pp. 75-85.
19 Construing reparations in terms of the legal notion of unjust enrichment makes it possible to avoid the problems of attempting to interpret the situation of black Americans vis-a-vis the white re- ligious institutions according to the analogy of treaty violations or war
reparations. For a careful discussion
of this interpretation, see Bedau, pp. 32-34. Additional discussions of the legal case for reparations for black people can be found in Graham Hughes,
"Reparations for Blacks?" New York University Law Review 43 (December, 1968),
pp. 1062-74; Daisy G. Collins, "The United States Owes Reparations to Its Black Citizens,"
Howard Law Joumal16 (Fall, 1970), pp. 82-114; and Boris I. Bittker, The Case for Black Reparations (New York: Random House, Inc., 1973).
12. The white religious organizations, as is true of all segments of the white establishment, have benefited from this unjust enrichment.
13. This unjust enrichment
provides the ethical basis for justifying compensation or "reparations" to blacks (pp. 118, 119, 120, 122, 124, 126).
14. Compensation should thus be paid to and on behalf of" all black
people" by the white established institutions (pp. 125, 126).
15. One of the" power
centers" of the white establishment is in the religious institutions, a'nd they can legitimately be required to pay their share of the compensation (p. 125).
16. The reparations funds will be used to establish
communications, political, economic and educational institutions to enable blacks to develop the individual and communal skills of which their heritage of slavery and abiding
institutional
racism has deprived them (pp. 120-22).
17. The sum of $500
million, or" $15 per nigger," is only" a beginning of the
reparations due" black people by the white religious organizations; even more will be demanded "from the United States Government"
(pp. 119-20,125).
18. The white religious
organizations are getting off easy; the demands made upon them of fifteen
dollars per black person are small demands (p. 125).
19. The white Christian
churches and Jewish synagogues can afford to pay $500 million reparations, for
they have "tremendous wealth" (p. 125).20
20. Therefore, the white
Christian churches and Jewish synagogues in America must pay $500 million in reparations to the black community.
Further premises could be
elaborated, but in my opinion the essential argument of the manifesto is contained in this summary. It is important to
emphasize the argument, because many of the responses to the manifesto were
more concerned with the document's rhetoric, often flamboyant and crudely Marxist, than with the central argument. Thus, for example, the
Council of the
American Lutheran
Church and the Southern Baptist Convention did not attempt to refute the
manifesto's ethical argument,21 they
dismissed the manifesto either because 'they regarded the language as impolite or inflammatory or because they
regarded the document as an attempt at extortion rather than a moral
pronouncement deserving serious attention.
Other individuals and groups specifically rejected the mani-festo because they did not accept the concept
of reparations, and the reasons they gave for that were varied. Some would not accept the
logic of financial atonement by today's whites for sins committed by others in
the past; some rejected the idea of reparations because they regarded it as a
too cheap means of assuaging guilt. A few affirmed reparations as morally justi-fiable but questioned whether
Forman and NBEDC were the approp-riate agencies to receive and dispense
reparation monies.22
20 There is no thorough and carefully documented study of the amount of wealth the churches have. There is some discussion of this in D. B. Robertson's Should the Churches be Taxed? (Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1968). See also Lecky and Wright, pp. 29-33, and Schuchter, pp. 175-80.
21 See pp. 205-6 above.
ALTERNATIVES To "REPARATIONS"
As AN ETHICAL
ARGUMENT
The more profound
critiques, however, came from individuals and groups who were deeply committed to
efforts to develop programs or policies to combat racism and poverty. These
critiques affirmed the need for intensive efforts to assist those for whom the manifesto
ostensibly spoke, but rejected the moral justifi-cation provided by the
manifesto and offered an alternative justification for programs for economic
development for blacks. Perhaps the clearest examples of alternative
justificatory arguments are provided by Michael Harrington and Arnold Kaufman
in two brief articles that appeared together in Dissent under
the title"
Black Reparations-Two Views."23 I shall
develop and extend their discussions in detail, because they contain in
compacted form the alternative ethical arguments a number of religious organizations and other individuals used to justify directing special energies
and funds to the black community.
The thrust of Harrington's critique of
the manifesto was that it developed its argument for economic development in
the black community in terms of reparations for wrongs inflicted in the
past, whereas the real argument ought to have been one that justified a redistribution
of present social resources so as to
compensate blacks who are disadvantaged by the social-economic system as it is
presently constituted. He called the Black Manifesto" an outlandish
scheme, which would not work in the unlikely event that it were even
tried."24 He argued that reparations were irrelevant and unwarranted,
because even if they were made they would do little to redistribute wealth in
our society. Harrington feared" there is a very real danger that political
energy will be diverted from the real struggle" of challenging the system
which provides such a grossly unequal
distribution of income in America He saw the real struggle that needs to take
place including two basic dimensions: (1) a policy of" genuine full
employment, which means eliminating underemployment, as well as
joblessness," and (2) "through a massive, planned, and sound
investment on the part of the government to do away with the slums and to
create new careers in health care, education, beautification, and the
like. "26
There are two distinguishable points in
Harrington's critique of the manifesto. The first point is pragmatic: demanding
reparations will not work and will quite possibly be counter-productive. Forman's "proposal could well divert precious
political energies from the actual struggle."27
The second point is that reparations are unwarranted and irrelevant,
because they would do little to equalize incomes anyway. Kaufman differed from Harrington on both points.
Unlike Harrington, Kaufman believed that the manifesto would strengthen
"the political will to support vast enlargement of compensatory governmental
programs."28
22 Christian Century 87 (February 11, 1970), p. 185; New York Times, June 10, 1970, pp. 49, 74; Lecky and
Wright, pp. 16-29; Schuchter, pp. 2-27.
23 Michael Harrington and
Arnold S. Kaufman, "Black Reparations-Two
Views," Dissent 16 (July-August,
1969),pp.317-20
24 Ibid.,, p. 317
25 Ibid.
26 lbid., p. 318.
27 Ibid.
28 iu«, p. 319.
He believed that the political significance of Forman's dramatic
presentation of the demands of the manifesto extended far beyond the intended
consequences of securing reparations from the churches. Kaufman's expectation
was that the moral issues raised concretely in relation to nongovernmental
institutions, the churches, would have a significant impact on legislative
action as a growing constituency is brought to accept the case for compensatory
justice.
Harrington's and Kaufman's first
point of disagreement is determined by their different assessments of the
political effectiveness in relation to governmental institutions of the Black
Manifesto's demands for reparations. To
determine whether Harrington or Kaufman was correct would require an extended
analysis of a number of complex political developments that occurred during the
past five years, and such an inquiry would take us far beyond the scope of this
paper.
Kaufman also differed with
Harrington on the point that reparations are unwarranted and irrelevant because
they would not remedy unequal income distribution in America. Harrington did
not oppose special compensatory programs that he believed would effectively
raise the income of the poor. He called for programs that would create new
careers for the poor in a variety of fields. But his justification for them was
one of redistribution of the wealth of the society rather than of reparations
for past wrongs. Though Kaufman, like Harrington, was primarily concerned
with governmental programs that would
improve the lot of the economically disadvantaged, he did endorse the principle
of reparations as a way of providing a justification for this. Kaufman
summarized his understanding of the principle as follows:
The demand
that the sons of slavemasters make restitution to the sons of slaves rests on
the claim that the former enjoy great and undeserved
benefits, the latter suffer grave and undeserved
disabilities, as a result of accidents of social inheritance directly connected
to the existence of slavery.29
Though he did not use the terminology, this interpretation of
the principle of reparations is essentially that of the unjust enrichment concept articulated in
the above summary of the manifesto's central argument. 30
In the final analysis, however, neither Kaufman
nor Harrington viewed rectification of the wrongs done to black people in terms of reparations, or the form of justice that would require that people
receive compensation for harm that has been inflicted on them. Harrington, in arguing for policies that would bring
about a redistribution of wealth rather than reparations, really viewed the moral problem as one of distributive justice rather than compensatory justice. The
distinction between the two is important, and one to which few of the recent discussions of justice by contemporary philosophers have given sufficient attention. John Rawls,
for example, in the most elaborate discussion of justice in recent times, views justice primarily as "a standard whereby the distributive aspects of the basic structure of society are to be assessed." Institutions are just
when no arbitrary distinctions are made between persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties and when the rules determine a proper balance between competing claims to the advantages of social life. 31
Rawls seldom even mentions compensatory justice, because he is concerned to develop a theory of distributive justice.
The chief difference between compensatory justice and distributive
justice depends, respectively, on whether an individual receives a benefit on account of some injury he has
suffered or on the basis of some basic distributive principles
which assign rights and duties and determine the distribution of burdens and benefits of
social cooperation. Distributive justice, therefore, is concerned
with the principles that govern
the creation of a system of rights (and
consequently of duties and obligations) and distribution of societal benefits, providing equal consideration for all, whereas compensatory justice comes
into operation when the scheme delineated by distributive justice has been
infringed. The
aim of compensatory justice is to restore the enjoyment of the infringed right, or if that is impossible to provide compensation to the injured party.32
Philosophers of previous
generations were not much more helpful than contemporary philosophers in explaining how compensation or reparations fits into a theory of justice. Henry Sidgwick, for example, wrote:
We have already noticed this as a simple deduction from the maxim of general Benevolence, which forbids us to do harm to our fellow-creatures: for if we have harmed them, we can yet approximately obey the maxim by giving compensation for the harm.
Though here the question arises whether we are bound to make reparation for harm that has been quite blamelessly caused: and it is not easy to answer it decisively. On the whole, I think we should condemn a man who did not offer some reparation for any serious injury caused by him to another-even if quite involuntarily caused, and without negligence: but perhaps we regard this rather as a duty of Benevolence-arising out of the
general sympathy that each ought to have for others, intensified by this special occasion-than as a duty of strict Justice. 33
But whether viewed as a duty of justice or
benevolence (and Sidgwick viewed the latter as the
more basic moral principle), Sidgwick did regard
reparations as fundamentally important in social
morality. Harrington's critique
of the manifesto ignores this
consideration, or at
least he does not regard it as the crucial issue which ought to be
emphasized if blacks are to receive their
fair share of the society's wealth.
The first of the crucial issues he regards as most
important in the contemporary struggle-full
employment-could be justified by classical utilitarianism
and welfare economics; the second-providing
training for certain kinds of jobs-could be
justified by distributive justice construed in the particular way I
will emphasize in a
moment. The point is that the
concept of
reparations has no relation to either of these two. Kaufman's
response to the manifesto is
somewhat more difficult to
characterize, for he did accept the principle of reparations, even
though his real concern was less a matter of restitution or
payment for injury than a matter of providing compensatory
programs. But when" compensation"
is discussed in these terms it is probably more
appropriate to interpret it in terms of dis-
tributive justice
than in terms of compensatory justice. The different understandings
of compensation when viewed from those perspectives require further
elucidation.
COMPENSATION IN DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
AND COMPENSATORY JUSTICE
The basic distinction between the two notions
of compensation was suggested by Richard Lichtman in an article, "The
Ethics of Compensatory Justice,"34 which preceded
the promulgation of the Black Manifesto by several
years but nevertheless anticipated some of
the discussion which followed the manifesto.
Lichtman argued that the past suffering
of the black person
seems beyond the remedy of
society to redeem. There is no
payment that can supply its balance. It would be a sign of contempt for the Negro
should the white community offer to compensate this debt, for there are trials of the spirit too large and awesome to stand comparison with any good that might be proposed as their measure. But the remaining evils of special incapacity and relative disadvantage in access to equal condition in society-equal role, status,
location, facility, service and wealth, in short, to the content
of" equal law" -can be remedied, and we are obliged to do so. That is, though the strictly compensatory act of payment for past suffering is impossible, the reparative or corrective aspects of compensation which attend the present and future are well within our power. 35
33 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of
Ethics (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966), pp. 281-
82.
34 Richard Lichtman, "The Ethics of
Compensatory Justice," Law in
Transition Quarterly 1
(Sprin&, 1964), pp.
76-103.
214
Compensation oriented
toward the present and future, rather than the past, can provide a
justification for benign quotas and preferential treatment in areas such as
housing, education and employment-the areas both Harrington and Kaufman want to
see emphasized. A number of individuals and a small number of church groups
also supported
programs of these kinds. My concern at this point is not to evaluate the merit of such programs, but to make it clear that a
justification for them involves an understanding of justice not viewed in terms
of reparations but rather in terms of distributive justice construed in terms of the
definition "to each according to his need." Curiously, even Calvin B. Marshall, chairman of the
Black Economic Development Conference, in his criticism of the failure of the
churches to respond to the manifesto appeal viewed this as evidence of their
"refusing to consider human need ... "36
The distinction here is
subtle and requires further elaboration. If distributive justice construed in
terms of treating people according to their need is understood as the
justification for programs specifically directed toward those whom the
manifesto wanted to assist, the definition of" need" must be enlarged
to include those special liabilities resulting from past deprivation. If
compensation is
understood as a provision of remedies for the present and future for injuries
which occurred in the past, rather than a payment or restitution for past harm
or wrong-doing, the provision is not directly measured by the amount of past
deprivation, but rather by the amount of present need.
An argument for compensation
interpreted in such a framework could be developed as follows. Present needs
are great, precisely because the long history of discrimination against the black man
has created problems that cannot be remedied by just lifting present
discriminatory barriers, even if that could be
magically accomplished. If the parents of a black child were reared in
Mississippi, where the educational system kept many blacks illiterate and the
culture inculcated in them a dismal outlook not only for their own future but
for that of their children, that child will need special remedial
instruction and
perhaps personal' counseling that a white middle-class child will not if he is equally to
realize his potential. If black men have for generations been denied the opportunity to acquire
technical skills, most recently because of discriminatory policies of labor
unions, especially in the crafts, opening up those unions to all technically
qualified will not enable them to become skilled workers; rather a
conscientious and deliberate effort must be made to include blacks in membership and training
programs. Thus one could argue that treatment to fulfill these
special needs is required by justice to
bring about full equality of opportunity and
to make up for discrimination-caused
disadvantages.37
It is difficult to determine whether such
treatment is required because of racial discrimination
suffered or simply because of present, objectively-determined
need.38 There is a close congruence
between the effects of racial
discrimination and certain basic needs. For example, a
black ghetto child who attends a
ghetto school may
require special services, a
remedial program and
additional personnel, because of
the needs created by the past experiences which he
and his fellows, as well as their
ancestors for many generations, suffered
because of discrimination;
but in that case the compensatory treatment he
receives would be directed toward
his present need, not to the
past discrimination. Is the
compensatory treatment the child receives one
which is provided him because of his race or because he
lives in an educationally deprived area? In this
instance, the practical
result is the same either
way, but the distinction is important for
two reasons. First, if past
racial discrimination rather than present need were the basis for
compensatory treatment, every black person, regardless
of present status, would be
entitled to compensation, for none
have totally escaped the effects of
past and present discrimination.
35 iu«, pp. 87-88. +
36 New York Times,
June 10,1970, p. 53
37 Important recent discussions related to the topic of "preferential hiring" or "inverse discrimination" include: J. L. Cowen, "Inverse Discrimination," Analysis 33, no. 1 (1972), pp. 10-12; Paul Taylor, .. Reverse Discrimination and Compensatory Justice," Analysis 33, no. 4 (1973), pp. 177-82;
Judith Jarvis Thompson, "Preferential Hiring," Philosophy and Public Affairs 2, no. 4 (Summer, 1973), pp. 364-84; and Robert Simon, "Preferential Hiring: A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thompson," Philosophy and Public Affairs 3, no. 3 (Spring, 1974), pp. 312-20.
38 Peter Marcuse has developed this distinction, though coming to the opposite conclusions from those developed in this presentation of the case for treatment based on need, in his contribution to Equality, ed. Charles Abrams (New York: Random House, Inc., 1965), pp. 136-9l.
The most
brilliant black
scholar in a major university would have an equally just claim for
compensation with the unemployed worker on the ghetto street corner. It is
possible that the scholar has suffered as greatly from injuries
inflicted by discrimination as the unemployed worker has, and he or she may have accomplished
even more if he or she had not suffered the injuries inflicted by discrimination. Thus
discrimination based on race alone creates certain needs that
deserve to be met, if one defines "need" in terms of
the difference between what an individual has or what he is, and what an individual
should have to be that which he is capable of being. But
according to the view we are developing here, this is too
much to
expect of public policy and the most that can be justified is a
concept of need that implies that there is a normative state or condition, the
absence of which is, or is likely to be, detrimental to the well-being of
the individual in question. If certain aspects of that state or condition
are absent, the individual can right-fully be considered deprived.39
This latter definition of "need," defined in
terms of the difference between what an individual has and
what he requires to achieve a level or standard which society recognizes as
a minimum, more clearly differentiates
treatment based on "race" and "need" and may be
more workable as a criterion for designing and justifying an educational or economic
policy which incorporates a compensatory principle. Secondly, if "race" rather
than "need" were the basis for compensatory policies, many
Americans who are not black but who have still suffered disadvantages from social and
economic structures would be excluded. Many inequalities have not come about because
of racial discrimination, but are nonetheless societally
inflicted deprivations over which the victims had no control. Though
there are significant differences between their particular
needs at some levels, especially at the most basic economic level, many Americans
from a wide variety of backgrounds-Indian Americans, Mexican-Americans, rural and
urban white Americans-share an existence in poverty which is at
least in part caused by social forces over which they had no control. Therefore,
according to this argument, though one can distinguish between compensatory
treatment on the basis of "race" and "need," the
latter seems to be the more appropriate criterion
for directing social policy.
William Lee Miller has stated well this
understanding of an expanded notion of society's
obligation to respond to special" needs" created by societally
imposed deprivation in his summary of the changing and developing goals of the
civil rights movement in the twentieth
century:
The first barrier, legal segregation, has been technically overcome; the second barrier, racial dis-
crimination, is being overcome, so far
as law and all sorts of corporate action can do it; we are
coming now to the third barrier-society-made
economic and educational disadvantage." 40
39 For an interesting discussion of the concept of "need," see R. S. Peters, The Concept of Motivation (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1958), pp. 17-18,104-106.
40 William Lee Miller, The Fifteenth Ward and the Great Society (Boston and Cambridge: Houghton
Mifflin Company and the Riverside Press, 1966), p. 186
Thus a strong case
can be made for viewing compensation as a requirement of distributive justice
interpreted in terms of need. Compensatory programs, from this point of view,
are essentially" forward looking." 41 That is, such programs are
designed to alleviate whatever disabilities stand in the way of a person's
securing some future good. It does not really take into account how these
disabilities came about; the real concern is to attend to whatever disabilities
exist so that those who are so afflicted may be brought to the point where they can
compete equally with others in the society. According to this understanding of
compensation, therefore, the history of injustices and exploitation suffered by
black people is not the relevant basis for their compensatory treatment. What is
strictly relevant is that such compensatory
treatment is necessary if some future goods-such as equality
of income, decent living conditions, capacity for
competing for available jobs, quality education, etc.-are to be secured. Or, to
put it
in other words, because there are a multitude of
causes which may bring about special needs, the
present condition of black people could have
been produced by anyone of-or any
combination of-a large number
of these causes. Compensation is intended to
remedy the present situation, however it may have
been produced; and to know the present
situation and how to remedy it
does not necessarily require us
to know exactly how it was brought about,
whether by injustice or some other causes
over which no one had any real control. In terms
of objective need, there
are white as well as black workers who
are almost totally unskilled, white
as well as black youths in need of jobs, white as well as
black
children in need of remedial
education.
By way of contrast, compensation construed in
terms of reparations is essentially "backward
looking." Reparations are due because
a breach of justice has occurred. Therefore, according
to this point of view, reparations to black people are required
precisely because of the fact that blacks have
collectively suffered from a history of injustice and
exploitation. Reparations may not remedy
completely the ill effects of these past
deeds, but they provide a formal acknowledgement
of the wrongs committed as the basis for the payment made
to the injured parties. In brief, whereas the aim
of compensation construed as a requirement of
distributive justice to meet special needs is to
procure some future good, the aim of
compensation
construed as reparations is to rectify past injustices.
Those
who argue for
compensation based on need as a requirement of
distributive justice fail to acknowledge the moral
claim inherent in a demand for reparations.
It is probably true that the
money provided as reparations to black people would not
be adequate to meet the needs of
those who have been deprived or
exploited in the past, even if the sum
were greater than the $500 million or $3 billion proposed by the
spokesmen for the Black Manifesto, so compensatory programs
based on special needs would still be necessary. But compensatory
programs alone cannot meet all the requirements of justice.
41 I have borrowed
the terms "forward looking" and "backward looking" from Bernard Boxill, "The Morality of Reparation," Social Theory and Practice 2 (Spring, 1972), pp, 113-23.
The avowed aim of
compensatory programs is forward
looking, and as such they do not affirm that the benefits they
provide are required
because of a prior injustice: Providing
reparations assumes and requires the acknowledgment
of injustice and the need to set right the wrongs
that have been committed. Put
theologically, repentance is
a necessity for true reconciliation to occur.42 The Black Manifesto
offered those to whom it was addressed an opportunity to acknowledge their
complicity in the history of exploitation and racism, so that by
acknowledging their role in this complex,
historical phenomenon of wrong-
doing they could begin to extricate themselves from it. This is
what compensatory programs based
on need cannot accomplish, and the mistake of Harrington and many churches has
been to try to reduce the one form of compensation to the other.
A CONCLUDING COMMENT
A number of objections to the manifesto could
be raised besides those I have emphasized by focusing initially on the
arguments developed by Harrington and Kaufman.
Objections could be raised about the possibility of
reconciling the mixture of "liberal" and" Marxist" concepts
intermingled in the text of the manifesto. Objections could be raised
concerning the possibility of
establishing mechanisms through which reparations would be administered and
claims adjudicated. Objections could be raised concerning how it would be
possible to calculate an accurate figure for the" unjust enrichment"
of the churches and synagogues. Objections
could be raised about the lack of clarity of the
relationship between the reparations demanded of religious institutions and the
reparations to be demanded of other institutions. I believe a number of these
objections
could be answered if there were space to develop and rebut them carefully, but
the purpose of this essay has not been to provide a full-blown defense of the
Black Manifesto. Rather, it has been to reassert the central argument of the
manifesto in order to demonstrate that justice requires not only a fair
distribution of rights and benefits, but that it also requires reparations when
certain of the most basic rights have been infringed.
Biblical and theological warrants could
be-indeed, in a fully systematic discussion
of the topic ought to be-provided for both distributive and compensatory
justice. The theological traditions of
both Christianity and Judaism, which buttress
the institutions to which the demands of the manifesto were ad-dressed, have a
great deal to say about repairing relationships when someone has been wronged
(compensatory justice) and about providing a fair distribution between persons
(distributive justice).
42 See William Stringfellow, "Reparations: Repentance as a
Necessity to Reconciliation,"
in Black Manifesto: Religion, Racism and Reparations, ed. Lecky and Wright, pp. 52·64.
The two are distinguishable, however, and it is
a
mistake to try to collapse the one into the other; both are necessary if we are
to have a truly just society. There is not space in this essay to delineate the
practical implications of interpreting compensatory justice and reparations as
applicable to women (and
perhaps other minorities) in addition to blacks. The discrimination
that women have experienced is not precisely the same as that which blacks have
suffered.
Nevertheless, the appropriateness of viewing these issues as fundamentally
important for churches and synagogues was stated well by Stephen Rose, who made
one of the clearest and most constructive responses to the manifesto when he
wrote:
Morally
speaking, the case for reparation is clear.
The nation has never provided adequate
recompense to blacks for
the years of slavery and degradation. Nor
has white society been willing to
recognize and repair
the damage it is doing to blacks in the cities. And it is
precisely the missionary
task of the church-as a
leaven-to do what society leaves undone, not in
order to become a substitute for the Government, but
rather to symbolize the way ahead for
the world. 43
By facing
squarely the argument for compensatory justice and reparations, the religious
institutions of America have an opportunity to take a stand against racism,
sexism and exploitation and for a greater realization of the goals of
"liberty" and" equality" in our common life. To provide
an adequate response we need clarity of argument as well as a broader vision of
the good society for which to hope and to work.
43 Stephen C. Rose, "Reparation Now!" Renewal
9 (June, 1969), p. 14.
The closest any Protestant
national body came to endorsing the
manifesto was the statement issued by the General Board of the National Council of Churches, which is not, of course, a denomination but an agency serving its member churches. The Board, while "rejecting the ideology of the Black Manifesto,"
declared that it was" aware of the grievances of the
black people of this nation" and "acknowledges the Black
Economic Development Conference as a
programmatic expression of the aspirations of black churchmen." The Board also voted to ask its 33 member denominations to raise $500 million and to give it,
without condition as to its use, to NCBC and IFCO.12
Although many individual
churchmen (especially black church-men), a Catholic group of lay people,
several ad hoc groups and at least one congregation endorsed the demand
for reparations as a just means for compensating blacks for
discrimination inflicted in the past,13 almost all the churches-especially at
official or national denominational levels-rejected the idea of reparations as
an appropriate moral justification for providing remedies to combat racism or
poverty afflicting black people. Before I attempt to make
9 Christian Century 86 (July 16,1969), p. 961.
10 Christian Century 87 (February
11,1970), p. 186.
11 Christian Century 86
(October I, 1969), pp. 1262-64. For
additional accounts of the response
of the Episcopal Church see Judy M. Foley, "Dealing with a Manifesto," The Episcopalian 134
(July, 1969), pp. 11-12, and David Owen,
"A Tale of Two Conferences-Part II," Renewal 9 (September-October, 1969), pp. 20-21.
12 Christian Century 86 (October
1,1969), p. 1239.
13 Christian Century 87
(February 11, 1970), pp. 186-88; New York Times, July 7, 1969, p. 18;
New York Times, June 10, 1970, pp. 49, 74.
some generalizations about the responses of the churches, however, it might be appropriate to
reconstruct the argument of the manifesto, for it is the merits of that
argument which must be appraised if we are going to attempt to view the
manifesto as having more than momentary significance.
THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT
OF THE MANIFESTO
It is clear to any reader
of the manifesto that its central argument is not easy to separate from the more
peripheral issues in the document. The argument is intertwined with revolutionary rhetoric, remarks expressing
passionate indignation, posturing threats to the white community, generalized predictions about the future of America and the world and a
brief sketch of how the reparation monies would be used once they are secured,
Therefore, it is necessary to concentrate on some of the most essential points
in order not to be confused or distracted from the basic ethical argument
justifying reparations to black people, The reconstructed argument below contains some premises drawn directly from the text of the manifesto-either 'as precise
quotations or paraphrases-and some premises which are interpolations of what
seem to be the tacit assumptions underlying some of the explicit assertions in
the text of the
document.14
l. In the early history of
slavery, blacks were wrenched from a" continent of peace" and brought
into" a hostile and alien environment" where they" have been
living in perpetual warfare since 1619" (p. 119),
2. The result has been
that blacks have suffered enormously" from racism and exploitation, cultural degradation and lack of
political power," all of which was caused by and is perpetuated by the
white capitalistic power structure (pp. 114, 116-17).
3, The white Christian
churches and Jewish synagogues are "part and parcel of the system of
capitalism" -in fact, they are" another form of government in this
country" -and as such they have actively exploited and continue to be used by a
government to exploit non-white people throughout the world (pp, 118,
119,120,125).15
4. The black people in
America are "the vanguard force" among exploited people now seeking
to throw off their oppressors (p, 116).
5. American blacks are the
legitimate heirs of the original victims of slavery in this country, and as such they can include in their heritage the harm and injury suffered by their parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, etc.
14 In developing this reconstruction of the
argument of the Black Manifesto, I am indebted to Hugo A. Bedau, "Compensatory Justice
and the Black Manifesto," The Monist 20 (1972), pp. 20-42.
The page references are to the version of the manifesto published in Lecky and Wright. Where no page references occur, the premises are my own
interpolations.
15 The ways in which the western missionary
movement has been inadvertently coupled with the economic, industrial, cultural and political
expansion of modern Europe and America into all parts of the world is examined
by Daisuke Kitagawa in ..'Racial' Man in the Modern World," in Man in Community, ed. Egbert deVries (New
York: Association Press, 1966), pp. 140-52.
6. The present existing
white religious organizations, which
affirm their historical identification with
their forebears, are liable'" to
present living blacks
for the harm inflicted by the historical
religious
organizations upon blacks in the past.
7. Historical
slavery and its continuing aftermath of institu-tional
racism had and
has as one of its primary aims"
developing the industrial base of the western world," particularly
the United States, which is "the most
industrialized country in the world"
(pp. 118, 125, 119).17
8. The wealth exacted by this systemic exploitation
has been fantastic; it amounts
to billions of dollars. 18
9. Much of this
tremendous wealth has
directly benefited
white religious organizations,
"the white Christian churches
and synagogues," or their
individual members (p. 120).
10. By way of contrast, almost none of this wealth benefited
those who were exploited over the centuries; they were denied the fruits of their labor.
11. This wealth has
accumulated through the profits of an
unjust, exploitative system, and consequently it represents an unjust enrichment's for white America.
16 Bedau, pp. 27-69, distinguishes
"liability" from "guilt." The latter suggests a context in
which punitive sanctions are appropriate, whereas the former involves responsibility but not a
punitive remedy. For a more extended discussion of the
difference between "guilt" and "liability," and the need to confine corporate responsibility to the latter, see Joel Feinberg,
"Collective Responsibility," in
his Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp.
231-33.
17 Historians are divided in
their opinions about how profitable the institution
of slavery was in its contribution
to the economic development of
this country. A sample of
this discussion can be found in Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (New York: Capicorn Books, 1966) and Robert S. Starobin, Industrial
Slavery in the Old South (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1970). Stanley M.
Elkins also addresses this question in Appendix B of his
excellent study, Slavery (2nd ed., Chicago
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1969). For an analysis of the continuing effects of
racism and
discrimination in relation to poverty, see Lester C. Thurow, Poverty and
Discrimination (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1969).
18 There have been a
number of attempts in recent years to
calculate the economic value of the labor supplied by black slaves to the development of
America's economy. See especially the contributions by Richard America, Brian G. M. McMain, Jim
Marketti and Robert S. Browne
to a collection of essays devoted to" reparations" in Review of Black Political Economy
2 (Winter,1972)
Other significant discussions of the economics of
slavery are: Alfred H. Conrad and John R. Meyer, "The Economics of Slavery in the Ante-Bellum
South," Journal of Political Economy 66 (April,1958); pp. 95-130; T. W. Schultz, "Investment in
Human Capital," American Economic Review 51(March, 1961), pp. 1-17; Gary S. Becker, "Investments
in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of
Political Economy 70 (October, 1962), Supplement 70, pp. 9-49;Julian Simon and Larry Neal," A Calculation
of the Black Reparations Bill," Review of Black
Political Economy 4 (Winter, 1974), pp. 75-85.
19 Construing reparations in terms of the legal notion of unjust enrichment makes it possible to avoid the problems of attempting to interpret the situation of black Americans vis-a-vis the white re- ligious institutions according to the analogy of treaty violations or war
reparations. For a careful discussion
of this interpretation, see Bedau, pp. 32-34. Additional discussions of the legal case for reparations for black people can be found in Graham Hughes,
"Reparations for Blacks?" New York University Law Review 43 (December, 1968),
pp. 1062-74; Daisy G. Collins, "The United States Owes Reparations to Its Black Citizens,"
Howard Law Joumal16 (Fall, 1970), pp. 82-114; and Boris I. Bittker, The Case for Black Reparations (New York: Random House, Inc., 1973).
12. The white religious organizations, as is true of all segments of the white establishment, have benefited from this unjust enrichment.
13. This unjust enrichment
provides the ethical basis for justifying compensation or "reparations" to blacks (pp. 118, 119, 120, 122, 124, 126).
14. Compensation should thus be paid to and on behalf of" all black
people" by the white established institutions (pp. 125, 126).
15. One of the" power
centers" of the white establishment is in the religious institutions, a'nd they can legitimately be required to pay their share of the compensation (p. 125).
16. The reparations funds will be used to establish
communications, political, economic and educational institutions to enable blacks to develop the individual and communal skills of which their heritage of slavery and abiding
institutional
racism has deprived them (pp. 120-22).
17. The sum of $500
million, or" $15 per nigger," is only" a beginning of the
reparations due" black people by the white religious organizations; even more will be demanded "from the United States Government"
(pp. 119-20,125).
18. The white religious
organizations are getting off easy; the demands made upon them of fifteen
dollars per black person are small demands (p. 125).
19. The white Christian
churches and Jewish synagogues can afford to pay $500 million reparations, for
they have "tremendous wealth" (p. 125).20
20. Therefore, the white
Christian churches and Jewish synagogues in America must pay $500 million in reparations to the black community.
Further premises could be
elaborated, but in my opinion the essential argument of the manifesto is contained in this summary. It is important to
emphasize the argument, because many of the responses to the manifesto were
more concerned with the document's rhetoric, often flamboyant and crudely Marxist, than with the central argument. Thus, for example, the
Council of the
American Lutheran
Church and the Southern Baptist Convention did not attempt to refute the
manifesto's ethical argument,21 they
dismissed the manifesto either because 'they regarded the language as impolite or inflammatory or because they
regarded the document as an attempt at extortion rather than a moral
pronouncement deserving serious attention.
Other individuals and groups specifically rejected the mani-festo because they did not accept the concept
of reparations, and the reasons they gave for that were varied. Some would not accept the
logic of financial atonement by today's whites for sins committed by others in
the past; some rejected the idea of reparations because they regarded it as a
too cheap means of assuaging guilt. A few affirmed reparations as morally justi-fiable but questioned whether
Forman and NBEDC were the approp-riate agencies to receive and dispense
reparation monies.22
20 There is no thorough and carefully documented study of the amount of wealth the churches have. There is some discussion of this in D. B. Robertson's Should the Churches be Taxed? (Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1968). See also Lecky and Wright, pp. 29-33, and Schuchter, pp. 175-80.
21 See pp. 205-6 above.
ALTERNATIVES To "REPARATIONS"
As AN ETHICAL
ARGUMENT
The more profound
critiques, however, came from individuals and groups who were deeply committed to
efforts to develop programs or policies to combat racism and poverty. These
critiques affirmed the need for intensive efforts to assist those for whom the manifesto
ostensibly spoke, but rejected the moral justifi-cation provided by the
manifesto and offered an alternative justification for programs for economic
development for blacks. Perhaps the clearest examples of alternative
justificatory arguments are provided by Michael Harrington and Arnold Kaufman
in two brief articles that appeared together in Dissent under
the title"
Black Reparations-Two Views."23 I shall
develop and extend their discussions in detail, because they contain in
compacted form the alternative ethical arguments a number of religious organizations and other individuals used to justify directing special energies
and funds to the black community.
The thrust of Harrington's critique of
the manifesto was that it developed its argument for economic development in
the black community in terms of reparations for wrongs inflicted in the
past, whereas the real argument ought to have been one that justified a redistribution
of present social resources so as to
compensate blacks who are disadvantaged by the social-economic system as it is
presently constituted. He called the Black Manifesto" an outlandish
scheme, which would not work in the unlikely event that it were even
tried."24 He argued that reparations were irrelevant and unwarranted,
because even if they were made they would do little to redistribute wealth in
our society. Harrington feared" there is a very real danger that political
energy will be diverted from the real struggle" of challenging the system
which provides such a grossly unequal
distribution of income in America He saw the real struggle that needs to take
place including two basic dimensions: (1) a policy of" genuine full
employment, which means eliminating underemployment, as well as
joblessness," and (2) "through a massive, planned, and sound
investment on the part of the government to do away with the slums and to
create new careers in health care, education, beautification, and the
like. "26
There are two distinguishable points in
Harrington's critique of the manifesto. The first point is pragmatic: demanding
reparations will not work and will quite possibly be counter-productive. Forman's "proposal could well divert precious
political energies from the actual struggle."27
The second point is that reparations are unwarranted and irrelevant,
because they would do little to equalize incomes anyway. Kaufman differed from Harrington on both points.
Unlike Harrington, Kaufman believed that the manifesto would strengthen
"the political will to support vast enlargement of compensatory governmental
programs."28
22 Christian Century 87 (February 11, 1970), p. 185; New York Times, June 10, 1970, pp. 49, 74; Lecky and
Wright, pp. 16-29; Schuchter, pp. 2-27.
23 Michael Harrington and
Arnold S. Kaufman, "Black Reparations-Two
Views," Dissent 16 (July-August,
1969),pp.317-20
24 Ibid.,, p. 317
25 Ibid.
26 lbid., p. 318.
27 Ibid.
28 iu«, p. 319.
He believed that the political significance of Forman's dramatic
presentation of the demands of the manifesto extended far beyond the intended
consequences of securing reparations from the churches. Kaufman's expectation
was that the moral issues raised concretely in relation to nongovernmental
institutions, the churches, would have a significant impact on legislative
action as a growing constituency is brought to accept the case for compensatory
justice.
Harrington's and Kaufman's first
point of disagreement is determined by their different assessments of the
political effectiveness in relation to governmental institutions of the Black
Manifesto's demands for reparations. To
determine whether Harrington or Kaufman was correct would require an extended
analysis of a number of complex political developments that occurred during the
past five years, and such an inquiry would take us far beyond the scope of this
paper.
Kaufman also differed with
Harrington on the point that reparations are unwarranted and irrelevant because
they would not remedy unequal income distribution in America. Harrington did
not oppose special compensatory programs that he believed would effectively
raise the income of the poor. He called for programs that would create new
careers for the poor in a variety of fields. But his justification for them was
one of redistribution of the wealth of the society rather than of reparations
for past wrongs. Though Kaufman, like Harrington, was primarily concerned
with governmental programs that would
improve the lot of the economically disadvantaged, he did endorse the principle
of reparations as a way of providing a justification for this. Kaufman
summarized his understanding of the principle as follows:
The demand
that the sons of slavemasters make restitution to the sons of slaves rests on
the claim that the former enjoy great and undeserved
benefits, the latter suffer grave and undeserved
disabilities, as a result of accidents of social inheritance directly connected
to the existence of slavery.29
Though he did not use the terminology, this interpretation of
the principle of reparations is essentially that of the unjust enrichment concept articulated in
the above summary of the manifesto's central argument. 30
In the final analysis, however, neither Kaufman
nor Harrington viewed rectification of the wrongs done to black people in terms of reparations, or the form of justice that would require that people
receive compensation for harm that has been inflicted on them. Harrington, in arguing for policies that would bring
about a redistribution of wealth rather than reparations, really viewed the moral problem as one of distributive justice rather than compensatory justice. The
distinction between the two is important, and one to which few of the recent discussions of justice by contemporary philosophers have given sufficient attention. John Rawls,
for example, in the most elaborate discussion of justice in recent times, views justice primarily as "a standard whereby the distributive aspects of the basic structure of society are to be assessed." Institutions are just
when no arbitrary distinctions are made between persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties and when the rules determine a proper balance between competing claims to the advantages of social life. 31
Rawls seldom even mentions compensatory justice, because he is concerned to develop a theory of distributive justice.
The chief difference between compensatory justice and distributive justice depends, respectively, on whether an individual receives a benefit on account of some injury he has suffered or on the basis of some basic distributive principles
which assign rights and duties and determine the distribution of burdens and benefits of social cooperation. Distributive justice, therefore, is concerned with the principles that govern the creation of a system of rights (and consequently of duties and obligations) and distribution of societal benefits, providing equal consideration for all, whereas compensatory justice comes into operation when the scheme delineated by distributive justice has been infringed. The aim of compensatory justice is to restore the enjoyment of the infringed right, or if that is impossible to provide compensation to the injured party.32
Philosophers of previous
generations were not much more helpful than contemporary philosophers in explaining how compensation or reparations fits into a theory of justice. Henry Sidgwick, for example, wrote:
We have already noticed this as a simple deduction from the maxim of general Benevolence, which forbids us to do harm to our fellow-creatures: for if we have harmed them, we can yet approximately obey the maxim by giving compensation for the harm.
Though here the question arises whether we are bound to make reparation for harm that has been quite blamelessly caused: and it is not easy to answer it decisively. On the whole, I think we should condemn a man who did not offer some reparation for any serious injury caused by him to another-even if quite involuntarily caused, and without negligence: but perhaps we regard this rather as a duty of Benevolence-arising out of the
general sympathy that each ought to have for others, intensified by this special occasion-than as a duty of strict Justice. 33
But whether viewed as a duty of justice or
benevolence (and Sidgwick viewed the latter as the
more basic moral principle), Sidgwick did regard
reparations as fundamentally important in social
morality. Harrington's critique
of the manifesto ignores this
consideration, or at
least he does not regard it as the crucial issue which ought to be
emphasized if blacks are to receive their
fair share of the society's wealth.
The first of the crucial issues he regards as most
important in the contemporary struggle-full
employment-could be justified by classical utilitarianism
and welfare economics; the second-providing
training for certain kinds of jobs-could be
justified by distributive justice construed in the particular way I
will emphasize in a
moment. The point is that the
concept of
reparations has no relation to either of these two. Kaufman's
response to the manifesto is
somewhat more difficult to
characterize, for he did accept the principle of reparations, even
though his real concern was less a matter of restitution or
payment for injury than a matter of providing compensatory
programs. But when" compensation"
is discussed in these terms it is probably more
appropriate to interpret it in terms of dis-
tributive justice
than in terms of compensatory justice. The different understandings
of compensation when viewed from those perspectives require further
elucidation.
COMPENSATION IN DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
AND COMPENSATORY JUSTICE
The basic distinction between the two notions
of compensation was suggested by Richard Lichtman in an article, "The
Ethics of Compensatory Justice,"34 which preceded
the promulgation of the Black Manifesto by several
years but nevertheless anticipated some of
the discussion which followed the manifesto.
Lichtman argued that the past suffering
of the black person
seems beyond the remedy of
society to redeem. There is no
payment that can supply its balance. It would be a sign of contempt for the Negro
should the white community offer to compensate this debt, for there are trials of the spirit too large and awesome to stand comparison with any good that might be proposed as their measure. But the remaining evils of special incapacity and relative disadvantage in access to equal condition in society-equal role, status,
location, facility, service and wealth, in short, to the content
of" equal law" -can be remedied, and we are obliged to do so. That is, though the strictly compensatory act of payment for past suffering is impossible, the reparative or corrective aspects of compensation which attend the present and future are well within our power. 35
33 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of
Ethics (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966), pp. 281-
82.
34 Richard Lichtman, "The Ethics of
Compensatory Justice," Law in
Transition Quarterly 1
(Sprin&, 1964), pp.
76-103.
214
Compensation oriented
toward the present and future, rather than the past, can provide a
justification for benign quotas and preferential treatment in areas such as
housing, education and employment-the areas both Harrington and Kaufman want to
see emphasized. A number of individuals and a small number of church groups
also supported
programs of these kinds. My concern at this point is not to evaluate the merit of such programs, but to make it clear that a
justification for them involves an understanding of justice not viewed in terms
of reparations but rather in terms of distributive justice construed in terms of the
definition "to each according to his need." Curiously, even Calvin B. Marshall, chairman of the
Black Economic Development Conference, in his criticism of the failure of the
churches to respond to the manifesto appeal viewed this as evidence of their
"refusing to consider human need ... "36
The distinction here is
subtle and requires further elaboration. If distributive justice construed in
terms of treating people according to their need is understood as the
justification for programs specifically directed toward those whom the
manifesto wanted to assist, the definition of" need" must be enlarged
to include those special liabilities resulting from past deprivation. If
compensation is understood as a provision of remedies for the present and future for injuries
which occurred in the past, rather than a payment or restitution for past harm
or wrong-doing, the provision is not directly measured by the amount of past
deprivation, but rather by the amount of present need.
An argument for compensation
interpreted in such a framework could be developed as follows. Present needs
are great, precisely because the long history of discrimination against the black man
has created problems that cannot be remedied by just lifting present
discriminatory barriers, even if that could be
magically accomplished. If the parents of a black child were reared in
Mississippi, where the educational system kept many blacks illiterate and the
culture inculcated in them a dismal outlook not only for their own future but
for that of their children, that child will need special remedial
instruction and
perhaps personal' counseling that a white middle-class child will not if he is equally to
realize his potential. If black men have for generations been denied the opportunity to acquire
technical skills, most recently because of discriminatory policies of labor
unions, especially in the crafts, opening up those unions to all technically
qualified will not enable them to become skilled workers; rather a
conscientious and deliberate effort must be made to include blacks in membership and training
programs. Thus one could argue that treatment to fulfill these
special needs is required by justice to
bring about full equality of opportunity and
to make up for discrimination-caused
disadvantages.37
It is difficult to determine whether such
treatment is required because of racial discrimination
suffered or simply because of present, objectively-determined
need.38 There is a close congruence
between the effects of racial
discrimination and certain basic needs. For example, a
black ghetto child who attends a
ghetto school may
require special services, a
remedial program and
additional personnel, because of
the needs created by the past experiences which he
and his fellows, as well as their
ancestors for many generations, suffered
because of discrimination;
but in that case the compensatory treatment he
receives would be directed toward
his present need, not to the
past discrimination. Is the
compensatory treatment the child receives one
which is provided him because of his race or because he
lives in an educationally deprived area? In this
instance, the practical
result is the same either
way, but the distinction is important for
two reasons. First, if past
racial discrimination rather than present need were the basis for
compensatory treatment, every black person, regardless
of present status, would be
entitled to compensation, for none
have totally escaped the effects of
past and present discrimination.
35 iu«, pp. 87-88. +
36 New York Times,
June 10,1970, p. 53
37 Important recent discussions related to the topic of "preferential hiring" or "inverse discrimination" include: J. L. Cowen, "Inverse Discrimination," Analysis 33, no. 1 (1972), pp. 10-12; Paul Taylor, .. Reverse Discrimination and Compensatory Justice," Analysis 33, no. 4 (1973), pp. 177-82;
Judith Jarvis Thompson, "Preferential Hiring," Philosophy and Public Affairs 2, no. 4 (Summer, 1973), pp. 364-84; and Robert Simon, "Preferential Hiring: A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thompson," Philosophy and Public Affairs 3, no. 3 (Spring, 1974), pp. 312-20.
38 Peter Marcuse has developed this distinction, though coming to the opposite conclusions from those developed in this presentation of the case for treatment based on need, in his contribution to Equality, ed. Charles Abrams (New York: Random House, Inc., 1965), pp. 136-9l.
The most brilliant black scholar in a major university would have an equally just claim for compensation with the unemployed worker on the ghetto street corner. It is possible that the scholar has suffered as greatly from injuries inflicted by discrimination as the unemployed worker has, and he or she may have accomplished even more if he or she had not suffered the injuries inflicted by discrimination. Thus discrimination based on race alone creates certain needs that deserve to be met, if one defines "need" in terms of the difference between what an individual has or what he is, and what an individual should have to be that which he is capable of being. But according to the view we are developing here, this is too much to expect of public policy and the most that can be justified is a concept of need that implies that there is a normative state or condition, the absence of which is, or is likely to be, detrimental to the well-being of the individual in question. If certain aspects of that state or condition are absent, the individual can right-fully be considered deprived.39
This latter definition of "need," defined in
terms of the difference between what an individual has and
what he requires to achieve a level or standard which society recognizes as
a minimum, more clearly differentiates
treatment based on "race" and "need" and may be
more workable as a criterion for designing and justifying an educational or economic
policy which incorporates a compensatory principle. Secondly, if "race" rather
than "need" were the basis for compensatory policies, many
Americans who are not black but who have still suffered disadvantages from social and
economic structures would be excluded. Many inequalities have not come about because
of racial discrimination, but are nonetheless societally
inflicted deprivations over which the victims had no control. Though
there are significant differences between their particular
needs at some levels, especially at the most basic economic level, many Americans
from a wide variety of backgrounds-Indian Americans, Mexican-Americans, rural and
urban white Americans-share an existence in poverty which is at
least in part caused by social forces over which they had no control. Therefore,
according to this argument, though one can distinguish between compensatory
treatment on the basis of "race" and "need," the
latter seems to be the more appropriate criterion
for directing social policy.
William Lee Miller has stated well this
understanding of an expanded notion of society's
obligation to respond to special" needs" created by societally
imposed deprivation in his summary of the changing and developing goals of the
civil rights movement in the twentieth
century:
The first barrier, legal segregation, has been technically overcome; the second barrier, racial dis-
crimination, is being overcome, so far
as law and all sorts of corporate action can do it; we are
coming now to the third barrier-society-made
economic and educational disadvantage." 40
39 For an interesting discussion of the concept of "need," see R. S. Peters, The Concept of Motivation (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1958), pp. 17-18,104-106.
40 William Lee Miller, The Fifteenth Ward and the Great Society (Boston and Cambridge: Houghton
Mifflin Company and the Riverside Press, 1966), p. 186
Thus a strong case
can be made for viewing compensation as a requirement of distributive justice
interpreted in terms of need. Compensatory programs, from this point of view,
are essentially" forward looking." 41 That is, such programs are
designed to alleviate whatever disabilities stand in the way of a person's
securing some future good. It does not really take into account how these
disabilities came about; the real concern is to attend to whatever disabilities
exist so that those who are so afflicted may be brought to the point where they can
compete equally with others in the society. According to this understanding of
compensation, therefore, the history of injustices and exploitation suffered by
black people is not the relevant basis for their compensatory treatment. What is
strictly relevant is that such compensatory
treatment is necessary if some future goods-such as equality
of income, decent living conditions, capacity for
competing for available jobs, quality education, etc.-are to be secured. Or, to
put it
in other words, because there are a multitude of
causes which may bring about special needs, the
present condition of black people could have
been produced by anyone of-or any
combination of-a large number
of these causes. Compensation is intended to
remedy the present situation, however it may have
been produced; and to know the present
situation and how to remedy it
does not necessarily require us
to know exactly how it was brought about,
whether by injustice or some other causes
over which no one had any real control. In terms
of objective need, there
are white as well as black workers who
are almost totally unskilled, white
as well as black youths in need of jobs, white as well as
black
children in need of remedial
education.
By way of contrast, compensation construed in
terms of reparations is essentially "backward
looking." Reparations are due because
a breach of justice has occurred. Therefore, according
to this point of view, reparations to black people are required
precisely because of the fact that blacks have
collectively suffered from a history of injustice and
exploitation. Reparations may not remedy
completely the ill effects of these past
deeds, but they provide a formal acknowledgement
of the wrongs committed as the basis for the payment made
to the injured parties. In brief, whereas the aim
of compensation construed as a requirement of
distributive justice to meet special needs is to
procure some future good, the aim of
compensation
construed as reparations is to rectify past injustices.
Those
who argue for
compensation based on need as a requirement of
distributive justice fail to acknowledge the moral
claim inherent in a demand for reparations.
It is probably true that the
money provided as reparations to black people would not
be adequate to meet the needs of
those who have been deprived or
exploited in the past, even if the sum
were greater than the $500 million or $3 billion proposed by the
spokesmen for the Black Manifesto, so compensatory programs
based on special needs would still be necessary. But compensatory
programs alone cannot meet all the requirements of justice.
41 I have borrowed
the terms "forward looking" and "backward looking" from Bernard Boxill, "The Morality of Reparation," Social Theory and Practice 2 (Spring, 1972), pp, 113-23.
The avowed aim of
compensatory programs is forward
looking, and as such they do not affirm that the benefits they
provide are required
because of a prior injustice: Providing
reparations assumes and requires the acknowledgment
of injustice and the need to set right the wrongs
that have been committed. Put
theologically, repentance is
a necessity for true reconciliation to occur.42 The Black Manifesto
offered those to whom it was addressed an opportunity to acknowledge their
complicity in the history of exploitation and racism, so that by
acknowledging their role in this complex,
historical phenomenon of wrong-
doing they could begin to extricate themselves from it. This is
what compensatory programs based
on need cannot accomplish, and the mistake of Harrington and many churches has
been to try to reduce the one form of compensation to the other.
A CONCLUDING COMMENT
A number of objections to the manifesto could
be raised besides those I have emphasized by focusing initially on the
arguments developed by Harrington and Kaufman.
Objections could be raised about the possibility of
reconciling the mixture of "liberal" and" Marxist" concepts
intermingled in the text of the manifesto. Objections could be raised
concerning the possibility of
establishing mechanisms through which reparations would be administered and
claims adjudicated. Objections could be raised concerning how it would be
possible to calculate an accurate figure for the" unjust enrichment"
of the churches and synagogues. Objections
could be raised about the lack of clarity of the
relationship between the reparations demanded of religious institutions and the
reparations to be demanded of other institutions. I believe a number of these
objections
could be answered if there were space to develop and rebut them carefully, but
the purpose of this essay has not been to provide a full-blown defense of the
Black Manifesto. Rather, it has been to reassert the central argument of the
manifesto in order to demonstrate that justice requires not only a fair
distribution of rights and benefits, but that it also requires reparations when
certain of the most basic rights have been infringed.
Biblical and theological warrants could
be-indeed, in a fully systematic discussion
of the topic ought to be-provided for both distributive and compensatory
justice. The theological traditions of
both Christianity and Judaism, which buttress
the institutions to which the demands of the manifesto were ad-dressed, have a
great deal to say about repairing relationships when someone has been wronged
(compensatory justice) and about providing a fair distribution between persons
(distributive justice).
42 See William Stringfellow, "Reparations: Repentance as a
Necessity to Reconciliation,"
in Black Manifesto: Religion, Racism and Reparations, ed. Lecky and Wright, pp. 52·64.
The two are distinguishable, however, and it is
a
mistake to try to collapse the one into the other; both are necessary if we are
to have a truly just society. There is not space in this essay to delineate the
practical implications of interpreting compensatory justice and reparations as
applicable to women (and
perhaps other minorities) in addition to blacks. The discrimination
that women have experienced is not precisely the same as that which blacks have
suffered.
Nevertheless, the appropriateness of viewing these issues as fundamentally
important for churches and synagogues was stated well by Stephen Rose, who made
one of the clearest and most constructive responses to the manifesto when he
wrote:
recognize and repair
the damage it is doing to blacks in the cities. And it is
precisely the missionary
task of the church-as a
leaven-to do what society leaves undone, not in
order to become a substitute for the Government, but
rather to symbolize the way ahead for
the world. 43
By facing
squarely the argument for compensatory justice and reparations, the religious
institutions of America have an opportunity to take a stand against racism,
sexism and exploitation and for a greater realization of the goals of
"liberty" and" equality" in our common life. To provide
an adequate response we need clarity of argument as well as a broader vision of
the good society for which to hope and to work.
43 Stephen C. Rose, "Reparation Now!" Renewal 9 (June, 1969), p.
4-26.
3 The most outstanding exception was an article by Max L. Stackhouse, "Reparations: A Call to
Repentance?" Lutheran Quarterly 21 (November, 1969), pp. 358-80. A briefer version of this was
printed in Renewal 9 (September-October, 1969), pp. 4-12.
I.
205 |
We reject in total the demands, principles and
methods espoused by the National Black Economic
|
4 Christian Century 87 (February 11, 1970), p. 186. 6 Ibid. 7 New York Times, May 22,1969, p. l. 8 Commonweal 90 (May 30, 1969), pp. 308-309. |
[1] My concern in this essay is not to
try to summarize all the responses of the various religious organizations to
the manifesto; rather, I shall suggest
that a basic perspective informed almost all of them and that the perspective failed to
accept or even address the argument of the manifesto
on its own grounds. Before moving to that discussion, however, it may be helpful to illustrate the general reaction to the manifesto by selecting some
representative comments.
By and large, Jewish and Catholic organizations rejected the manifesto out
of hand. The American Jewish Committee officially withdrew from IFCO because in
the committee's opinion I FCO refused to take a "clear stand as to where it stood on
the matter of the ideology of the Black Manifesto with its call to guerilla
warfare and resort to arms to bring down the government."! The Synagogue Council of America, representing all branches of
American Judaism, and the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, composed of most of the Jewish
civic and humanitarian organizations, rejected both the substantive demands of
the manifesto and the tactics used to present the
demands "on both moral and practical grounds.”5 The Rabbinical Council of America, an Orthodox group, rejected the manifesto'sCouncil of America, an Orthodox group, rejected the manifesto's demands" categorically," explaining that "just as we have the responsibility to combat white racism, so do we have the equal responsibility to combat black racism which tries-consciously or unconsciously-to perpetuate black racism. "6
The response of the Archdiocese of
New York was typical of---even if more harsh than most-official Roman Catholic reaction to the
manifesto. Its statement rejecting the manifesto emphasized that it was" regrettable"
that the manifesto related its concerns through "political concepts which are completely
contrary to our American way of life,"7 and went on to enumerate the numerous programs the archdiocese
was providing for
poor and black
people. (Commonweal later editorialized that the archdiocese could
surely have done better than to point to its charities and educational expenditures.8)
Responses from Protestant church bodies
were more varied. Almost all rejected the manifesto, but some did so by pointing to already existing programs organized to
combat racism or poverty, whereas others did organize some new programs for black development. The Southern Baptist Convention, though not a direct recipient of manifesto demands, nevertheless approved a statement
condemning the Black Manifesto:
The Council of the American Lutheran Church was almost as vehement in its
rejection, objecting to the manifesto's “strong, course, inflammatory language;”10 but it promised to begin an aggressive
program to focus on racism and poverty.
The Episcopal Church, at a
special general convention, adopted a compromise measure calling for the
raising of $200,000 for the National Committee of Black Churchmen (NCBC), an
interdenominational group of black clergymen, rather than for NBEDC, and made special reference to a 1967 funding
criterion which refused to allow funds to go to "any individual or group
which advocated the use of violence as part of its program." A resolution
was adopted which rejected "much of the ideology of the' Black Manifesto' " but recognized NBEDC as a movement which is an "expression of
self-determination for the
organizing of the black community in America." Though money raised through this special fund eventually was channeled to NBEDC, the leaders of the church
took pains to insist that the church's action should not be interpreted
as a response to the manifesto. A press release announcing
the voluntary offering to raise money for the fund made this clear. It read, in
part: "This fund should not be considered a response to the Black
Manifesto, nor an acceptance of the concept of reparations. Rather, it was understood as an expression of trust in the black leadership of the church.”11
The closest any Protestant
national body came to endorsing the
manifesto was the statement issued by the General Board of the National Council of Churches, which is not, of course, a denomination but an agency serving its member churches. The Board, while "rejecting the ideology of the Black Manifesto,"
declared that it was" aware of the grievances of the
black people of this nation" and "acknowledges the Black
Economic Development Conference as a
programmatic expression of the aspirations of black churchmen." The Board also voted to ask its 33 member denominations to raise $500 million and to give it,
without condition as to its use, to NCBC and IFCO.12
Although many individual
churchmen (especially black church-men), a Catholic group of lay people,
several ad hoc groups and at least one congregation endorsed the demand
for reparations as a just means for compensating blacks for
discrimination inflicted in the past,13 almost all the churches-especially at
official or national denominational levels-rejected the idea of reparations as
an appropriate moral justification for providing remedies to combat racism or
poverty afflicting black people. Before I attempt to make
9 Christian Century 86 (July 16,1969), p. 961.
10 Christian Century 87 (February
11,1970), p. 186.
11 Christian Century 86
(October I, 1969), pp. 1262-64. For
additional accounts of the response
of the Episcopal Church see Judy M. Foley, "Dealing with a Manifesto," The Episcopalian 134
(July, 1969), pp. 11-12, and David Owen,
"A Tale of Two Conferences-Part II," Renewal 9 (September-October, 1969), pp. 20-21.
12 Christian Century 86 (October
1,1969), p. 1239.
13 Christian Century 87
(February 11, 1970), pp. 186-88; New York Times, July 7, 1969, p. 18;
New York Times, June 10, 1970, pp. 49, 74.
some generalizations about the responses of the churches, however, it might be appropriate to
reconstruct the argument of the manifesto, for it is the merits of that
argument which must be appraised if we are going to attempt to view the
manifesto as having more than momentary significance.
THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT
OF THE MANIFESTO
It is clear to any reader
of the manifesto that its central argument is not easy to separate from the more
peripheral issues in the document. The argument is intertwined with revolutionary rhetoric, remarks expressing
passionate indignation, posturing threats to the white community, generalized predictions about the future of America and the world and a
brief sketch of how the reparation monies would be used once they are secured,
Therefore, it is necessary to concentrate on some of the most essential points
in order not to be confused or distracted from the basic ethical argument
justifying reparations to black people, The reconstructed argument below contains some premises drawn directly from the text of the manifesto-either 'as precise
quotations or paraphrases-and some premises which are interpolations of what
seem to be the tacit assumptions underlying some of the explicit assertions in
the text of the
document.14
l. In the early history of
slavery, blacks were wrenched from a" continent of peace" and brought
into" a hostile and alien environment" where they" have been
living in perpetual warfare since 1619" (p. 119),
2. The result has been
that blacks have suffered enormously" from racism and exploitation, cultural degradation and lack of
political power," all of which was caused by and is perpetuated by the
white capitalistic power structure (pp. 114, 116-17).
3, The white Christian churches and Jewish synagogues are "part and parcel of the system of capitalism" -in fact, they are" another form of government in this country" -and as such they have actively exploited and continue to be used by a government to exploit non-white people throughout the world (pp, 118, 119,120,125).15
4. The black people in
America are "the vanguard force" among exploited people now seeking
to throw off their oppressors (p, 116).
5. American blacks are the
legitimate heirs of the original victims of slavery in this country, and as such they can include in their heritage the harm and injury suffered by their parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, etc.
14 In developing this reconstruction of the
argument of the Black Manifesto, I am indebted to Hugo A. Bedau, "Compensatory Justice
and the Black Manifesto," The Monist 20 (1972), pp. 20-42.
The page references are to the version of the manifesto published in Lecky and Wright. Where no page references occur, the premises are my own
interpolations.
15 The ways in which the western missionary
movement has been inadvertently coupled with the economic, industrial, cultural and political
expansion of modern Europe and America into all parts of the world is examined
by Daisuke Kitagawa in ..'Racial' Man in the Modern World," in Man in Community, ed. Egbert deVries (New
York: Association Press, 1966), pp. 140-52.
6. The present existing
white religious organizations, which
affirm their historical identification with
their forebears, are liable'" to
present living blacks
for the harm inflicted by the historical
religious
organizations upon blacks in the past.
7. Historical
slavery and its continuing aftermath of institu-tional
racism had and
has as one of its primary aims"
developing the industrial base of the western world," particularly
the United States, which is "the most
industrialized country in the world"
(pp. 118, 125, 119).17
8. The wealth exacted by this systemic exploitation
has been fantastic; it amounts
to billions of dollars. 18
9. Much of this
tremendous wealth has
directly benefited
white religious organizations,
"the white Christian churches
and synagogues," or their
individual members (p. 120).
10. By way of contrast, almost none of this wealth benefited
those who were exploited over the centuries; they were denied the fruits of their labor.
11. This wealth has
accumulated through the profits of an
unjust, exploitative system, and consequently it represents an unjust enrichment's for white America.
16 Bedau, pp. 27-69, distinguishes
"liability" from "guilt." The latter suggests a context in
which punitive sanctions are appropriate, whereas the former involves responsibility but not a
punitive remedy. For a more extended discussion of the
difference between "guilt" and "liability," and the need to confine corporate responsibility to the latter, see Joel Feinberg,
"Collective Responsibility," in
his Doing and Deserving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp.
231-33.
17 Historians are divided in
their opinions about how profitable the institution
of slavery was in its contribution
to the economic development of
this country. A sample of
this discussion can be found in Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (New York: Capicorn Books, 1966) and Robert S. Starobin, Industrial
Slavery in the Old South (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1970). Stanley M.
Elkins also addresses this question in Appendix B of his
excellent study, Slavery (2nd ed., Chicago
and London: University of Chicago Press, 1969). For an analysis of the continuing effects of
racism and
discrimination in relation to poverty, see Lester C. Thurow, Poverty and
Discrimination (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1969).
18 There have been a
number of attempts in recent years to
calculate the economic value of the labor supplied by black slaves to the development of
America's economy. See especially the contributions by Richard America, Brian G. M. McMain, Jim
Marketti and Robert S. Browne
to a collection of essays devoted to" reparations" in Review of Black Political Economy
2 (Winter,1972)
Other significant discussions of the economics of
slavery are: Alfred H. Conrad and John R. Meyer, "The Economics of Slavery in the Ante-Bellum
South," Journal of Political Economy 66 (April,1958); pp. 95-130; T. W. Schultz, "Investment in
Human Capital," American Economic Review 51(March, 1961), pp. 1-17; Gary S. Becker, "Investments
in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of
Political Economy 70 (October, 1962), Supplement 70, pp. 9-49;Julian Simon and Larry Neal," A Calculation
of the Black Reparations Bill," Review of Black
Political Economy 4 (Winter, 1974), pp. 75-85.
19 Construing reparations in terms of the legal notion of unjust enrichment makes it possible to avoid the problems of attempting to interpret the situation of black Americans vis-a-vis the white re- ligious institutions according to the analogy of treaty violations or war
reparations. For a careful discussion
of this interpretation, see Bedau, pp. 32-34. Additional discussions of the legal case for reparations for black people can be found in Graham Hughes,
"Reparations for Blacks?" New York University Law Review 43 (December, 1968),
pp. 1062-74; Daisy G. Collins, "The United States Owes Reparations to Its Black Citizens,"
Howard Law Joumal16 (Fall, 1970), pp. 82-114; and Boris I. Bittker, The Case for Black Reparations (New York: Random House, Inc., 1973).
12. The white religious organizations, as is true of all segments of the white establishment, have benefited from this unjust enrichment.
13. This unjust enrichment
provides the ethical basis for justifying compensation or "reparations" to blacks (pp. 118, 119, 120, 122, 124, 126).
14. Compensation should thus be paid to and on behalf of" all black
people" by the white established institutions (pp. 125, 126).
15. One of the" power
centers" of the white establishment is in the religious institutions, a'nd they can legitimately be required to pay their share of the compensation (p. 125).
16. The reparations funds will be used to establish
communications, political, economic and educational institutions to enable blacks to develop the individual and communal skills of which their heritage of slavery and abiding
institutional
racism has deprived them (pp. 120-22).
17. The sum of $500
million, or" $15 per nigger," is only" a beginning of the
reparations due" black people by the white religious organizations; even more will be demanded "from the United States Government"
(pp. 119-20,125).
18. The white religious
organizations are getting off easy; the demands made upon them of fifteen
dollars per black person are small demands (p. 125).
19. The white Christian
churches and Jewish synagogues can afford to pay $500 million reparations, for
they have "tremendous wealth" (p. 125).20
20. Therefore, the white
Christian churches and Jewish synagogues in America must pay $500 million in reparations to the black community.
Further premises could be
elaborated, but in my opinion the essential argument of the manifesto is contained in this summary. It is important to
emphasize the argument, because many of the responses to the manifesto were
more concerned with the document's rhetoric, often flamboyant and crudely Marxist, than with the central argument. Thus, for example, the
Council of the
American Lutheran
Church and the Southern Baptist Convention did not attempt to refute the
manifesto's ethical argument,21 they
dismissed the manifesto either because 'they regarded the language as impolite or inflammatory or because they
regarded the document as an attempt at extortion rather than a moral
pronouncement deserving serious attention.
Other individuals and groups specifically rejected the mani-festo because they did not accept the concept
of reparations, and the reasons they gave for that were varied. Some would not accept the
logic of financial atonement by today's whites for sins committed by others in
the past; some rejected the idea of reparations because they regarded it as a
too cheap means of assuaging guilt. A few affirmed reparations as morally justi-fiable but questioned whether
Forman and NBEDC were the approp-riate agencies to receive and dispense
reparation monies.22
20 There is no thorough and carefully documented study of the amount of wealth the churches have. There is some discussion of this in D. B. Robertson's Should the Churches be Taxed? (Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1968). See also Lecky and Wright, pp. 29-33, and Schuchter, pp. 175-80.
21 See pp. 205-6 above.
ALTERNATIVES To "REPARATIONS"
As AN ETHICAL
ARGUMENT
The more profound
critiques, however, came from individuals and groups who were deeply committed to
efforts to develop programs or policies to combat racism and poverty. These
critiques affirmed the need for intensive efforts to assist those for whom the manifesto
ostensibly spoke, but rejected the moral justifi-cation provided by the
manifesto and offered an alternative justification for programs for economic
development for blacks. Perhaps the clearest examples of alternative
justificatory arguments are provided by Michael Harrington and Arnold Kaufman
in two brief articles that appeared together in Dissent under
the title"
Black Reparations-Two Views."23 I shall
develop and extend their discussions in detail, because they contain in
compacted form the alternative ethical arguments a number of religious organizations and other individuals used to justify directing special energies
and funds to the black community.
compensate blacks who are disadvantaged by the social-economic system as it is presently constituted. He called the Black Manifesto" an outlandish scheme, which would not work in the unlikely event that it were even tried."24 He argued that reparations were irrelevant and unwarranted, because even if they were made they would do little to redistribute wealth in our society. Harrington feared" there is a very real danger that political energy will be diverted from the real struggle" of challenging the system which provides such a grossly unequal
distribution of income in America He saw the real struggle that needs to take place including two basic dimensions: (1) a policy of" genuine full employment, which means eliminating underemployment, as well as joblessness," and (2) "through a massive, planned, and sound investment on the part of the government to do away with the slums and to create new careers in health care, education, beautification, and the like. "26
There are two distinguishable points in
Harrington's critique of the manifesto. The first point is pragmatic: demanding
reparations will not work and will quite possibly be counter-productive. Forman's "proposal could well divert precious
political energies from the actual struggle."27
The second point is that reparations are unwarranted and irrelevant,
because they would do little to equalize incomes anyway. Kaufman differed from Harrington on both points.
Unlike Harrington, Kaufman believed that the manifesto would strengthen
"the political will to support vast enlargement of compensatory governmental
programs."28
22 Christian Century 87 (February 11, 1970), p. 185; New York Times, June 10, 1970, pp. 49, 74; Lecky and
Wright, pp. 16-29; Schuchter, pp. 2-27.
23 Michael Harrington and
Arnold S. Kaufman, "Black Reparations-Two
Views," Dissent 16 (July-August,
1969),pp.317-20
24 Ibid.,, p. 317
25 Ibid.
26 lbid., p. 318.
27 Ibid.
28 iu«, p. 319.
He believed that the political significance of Forman's dramatic
presentation of the demands of the manifesto extended far beyond the intended
consequences of securing reparations from the churches. Kaufman's expectation
was that the moral issues raised concretely in relation to nongovernmental
institutions, the churches, would have a significant impact on legislative
action as a growing constituency is brought to accept the case for compensatory
justice.
Harrington's and Kaufman's first
point of disagreement is determined by their different assessments of the
political effectiveness in relation to governmental institutions of the Black
Manifesto's demands for reparations. To
determine whether Harrington or Kaufman was correct would require an extended
analysis of a number of complex political developments that occurred during the
past five years, and such an inquiry would take us far beyond the scope of this
paper.
Kaufman also differed with
Harrington on the point that reparations are unwarranted and irrelevant because
they would not remedy unequal income distribution in America. Harrington did
not oppose special compensatory programs that he believed would effectively
raise the income of the poor. He called for programs that would create new
careers for the poor in a variety of fields. But his justification for them was
one of redistribution of the wealth of the society rather than of reparations
for past wrongs. Though Kaufman, like Harrington, was primarily concerned
with governmental programs that would
improve the lot of the economically disadvantaged, he did endorse the principle
of reparations as a way of providing a justification for this. Kaufman
summarized his understanding of the principle as follows:
The demand
that the sons of slavemasters make restitution to the sons of slaves rests on
the claim that the former enjoy great and undeserved
benefits, the latter suffer grave and undeserved
disabilities, as a result of accidents of social inheritance directly connected
to the existence of slavery.29
Though he did not use the terminology, this interpretation of
the principle of reparations is essentially that of the unjust enrichment concept articulated in
the above summary of the manifesto's central argument. 30
In the final analysis, however, neither Kaufman
nor Harrington viewed rectification of the wrongs done to black people in terms of reparations, or the form of justice that would require that people
receive compensation for harm that has been inflicted on them. Harrington, in arguing for policies that would bring
about a redistribution of wealth rather than reparations, really viewed the moral problem as one of distributive justice rather than compensatory justice. The
distinction between the two is important, and one to which few of the recent discussions of justice by contemporary philosophers have given sufficient attention. John Rawls,
for example, in the most elaborate discussion of justice in recent times, views justice primarily as "a standard whereby the distributive aspects of the basic structure of society are to be assessed." Institutions are just
when no arbitrary distinctions are made between persons in the assigning of basic rights and duties and when the rules determine a proper balance between competing claims to the advantages of social life. 31
Rawls seldom even mentions compensatory justice, because he is concerned to develop a theory of distributive justice.
The chief difference between compensatory justice and distributive
justice depends, respectively, on whether an individual receives a benefit on account of some injury he has
suffered or on the basis of some basic distributive principles
which assign rights and duties and determine the distribution of burdens and benefits of
social cooperation. Distributive justice, therefore, is concerned
with the principles that govern
the creation of a system of rights (and
consequently of duties and obligations) and distribution of societal benefits, providing equal consideration for all, whereas compensatory justice comes
into operation when the scheme delineated by distributive justice has been
infringed. The
aim of compensatory justice is to restore the enjoyment of the infringed right, or if that is impossible to provide compensation to the injured party.32
Philosophers of previous
generations were not much more helpful than contemporary philosophers in explaining how compensation or reparations fits into a theory of justice. Henry Sidgwick, for example, wrote:
We have already noticed this as a simple deduction from the maxim of general Benevolence, which forbids us to do harm to our fellow-creatures: for if we have harmed them, we can yet approximately obey the maxim by giving compensation for the harm.
Though here the question arises whether we are bound to make reparation for harm that has been quite blamelessly caused: and it is not easy to answer it decisively. On the whole, I think we should condemn a man who did not offer some reparation for any serious injury caused by him to another-even if quite involuntarily caused, and without negligence: but perhaps we regard this rather as a duty of Benevolence-arising out of the
general sympathy that each ought to have for others, intensified by this special occasion-than as a duty of strict Justice. 33
But whether viewed as a duty of justice or
benevolence (and Sidgwick viewed the latter as the
more basic moral principle), Sidgwick did regard
reparations as fundamentally important in social
morality. Harrington's critique
of the manifesto ignores this
consideration, or at
least he does not regard it as the crucial issue which ought to be
emphasized if blacks are to receive their
fair share of the society's wealth.
The first of the crucial issues he regards as most
important in the contemporary struggle-full
employment-could be justified by classical utilitarianism
and welfare economics; the second-providing
training for certain kinds of jobs-could be
justified by distributive justice construed in the particular way I
will emphasize in a
moment. The point is that the
concept of
reparations has no relation to either of these two. Kaufman's
response to the manifesto is
somewhat more difficult to
characterize, for he did accept the principle of reparations, even
though his real concern was less a matter of restitution or
payment for injury than a matter of providing compensatory
programs. But when" compensation"
is discussed in these terms it is probably more
appropriate to interpret it in terms of dis-
tributive justice
than in terms of compensatory justice. The different understandings
of compensation when viewed from those perspectives require further
elucidation.
COMPENSATION IN DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
AND COMPENSATORY JUSTICE
The basic distinction between the two notions
of compensation was suggested by Richard Lichtman in an article, "The
Ethics of Compensatory Justice,"34 which preceded
the promulgation of the Black Manifesto by several
years but nevertheless anticipated some of
the discussion which followed the manifesto.
Lichtman argued that the past suffering
of the black person
seems beyond the remedy of
society to redeem. There is no
payment that can supply its balance. It would be a sign of contempt for the Negro
should the white community offer to compensate this debt, for there are trials of the spirit too large and awesome to stand comparison with any good that might be proposed as their measure. But the remaining evils of special incapacity and relative disadvantage in access to equal condition in society-equal role, status,
location, facility, service and wealth, in short, to the content
of" equal law" -can be remedied, and we are obliged to do so. That is, though the strictly compensatory act of payment for past suffering is impossible, the reparative or corrective aspects of compensation which attend the present and future are well within our power. 35
33 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of
Ethics (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966), pp. 281-
82.
34 Richard Lichtman, "The Ethics of
Compensatory Justice," Law in
Transition Quarterly 1
(Sprin&, 1964), pp.
76-103.
Compensation oriented
toward the present and future, rather than the past, can provide a
justification for benign quotas and preferential treatment in areas such as
housing, education and employment-the areas both Harrington and Kaufman want to
see emphasized. A number of individuals and a small number of church groups
also supported
programs of these kinds. My concern at this point is not to evaluate the merit of such programs, but to make it clear that a
justification for them involves an understanding of justice not viewed in terms
of reparations but rather in terms of distributive justice construed in terms of the
definition "to each according to his need." Curiously, even Calvin B. Marshall, chairman of the
Black Economic Development Conference, in his criticism of the failure of the
churches to respond to the manifesto appeal viewed this as evidence of their
"refusing to consider human need ... "36
The distinction here is
subtle and requires further elaboration. If distributive justice construed in
terms of treating people according to their need is understood as the
justification for programs specifically directed toward those whom the
manifesto wanted to assist, the definition of" need" must be enlarged
to include those special liabilities resulting from past deprivation. If
compensation is
understood as a provision of remedies for the present and future for injuries
which occurred in the past, rather than a payment or restitution for past harm
or wrong-doing, the provision is not directly measured by the amount of past
deprivation, but rather by the amount of present need.
An argument for compensation
interpreted in such a framework could be developed as follows. Present needs
are great, precisely because the long history of discrimination against the black man
has created problems that cannot be remedied by just lifting present
discriminatory barriers, even if that could be
magically accomplished. If the parents of a black child were reared in
Mississippi, where the educational system kept many blacks illiterate and the
culture inculcated in them a dismal outlook not only for their own future but
for that of their children, that child will need special remedial
instruction and
perhaps personal' counseling that a white middle-class child will not if he is equally to
realize his potential. If black men have for generations been denied the opportunity to acquire
technical skills, most recently because of discriminatory policies of labor
unions, especially in the crafts, opening up those unions to all technically
qualified will not enable them to become skilled workers; rather a
conscientious and deliberate effort must be made to include blacks in membership and training
programs. Thus one could argue that treatment to fulfill these
special needs is required by justice to
bring about full equality of opportunity and
to make up for discrimination-caused
disadvantages.37
It is difficult to determine whether such
treatment is required because of racial discrimination
suffered or simply because of present, objectively-determined
need.38 There is a close congruence
between the effects of racial
discrimination and certain basic needs. For example, a
black ghetto child who attends a
ghetto school may
require special services, a
remedial program and
additional personnel, because of
the needs created by the past experiences which he
and his fellows, as well as their
ancestors for many generations, suffered
because of discrimination;
but in that case the compensatory treatment he
receives would be directed toward
his present need, not to the
past discrimination. Is the
compensatory treatment the child receives one
which is provided him because of his race or because he
lives in an educationally deprived area? In this
instance, the practical
result is the same either
way, but the distinction is important for
two reasons. First, if past
racial discrimination rather than present need were the basis for
compensatory treatment, every black person, regardless
of present status, would be
entitled to compensation, for none
have totally escaped the effects of
past and present discrimination.
35 iu«, pp. 87-88. +
36 New York Times,
June 10,1970, p. 53
37 Important recent discussions related to the topic of "preferential hiring" or "inverse discrimination" include: J. L. Cowen, "Inverse Discrimination," Analysis 33, no. 1 (1972), pp. 10-12; Paul Taylor, .. Reverse Discrimination and Compensatory Justice," Analysis 33, no. 4 (1973), pp. 177-82;
Judith Jarvis Thompson, "Preferential Hiring," Philosophy and Public Affairs 2, no. 4 (Summer, 1973), pp. 364-84; and Robert Simon, "Preferential Hiring: A Reply to Judith Jarvis Thompson," Philosophy and Public Affairs 3, no. 3 (Spring, 1974), pp. 312-20.
38 Peter Marcuse has developed this distinction, though coming to the opposite conclusions from those developed in this presentation of the case for treatment based on need, in his contribution to Equality, ed. Charles Abrams (New York: Random House, Inc., 1965), pp. 136-9l.
The most
brilliant black
scholar in a major university would have an equally just claim for
compensation with the unemployed worker on the ghetto street corner. It is
possible that the scholar has suffered as greatly from injuries
inflicted by discrimination as the unemployed worker has, and he or she may have accomplished
even more if he or she had not suffered the injuries inflicted by discrimination. Thus
discrimination based on race alone creates certain needs that
deserve to be met, if one defines "need" in terms of
the difference between what an individual has or what he is, and what an individual
should have to be that which he is capable of being. But
according to the view we are developing here, this is too
much to
expect of public policy and the most that can be justified is a
concept of need that implies that there is a normative state or condition, the
absence of which is, or is likely to be, detrimental to the well-being of
the individual in question. If certain aspects of that state or condition
are absent, the individual can right-fully be considered deprived.39
This latter definition of "need," defined in
terms of the difference between what an individual has and
what he requires to achieve a level or standard which society recognizes as
a minimum, more clearly differentiates
treatment based on "race" and "need" and may be
more workable as a criterion for designing and justifying an educational or economic
policy which incorporates a compensatory principle. Secondly, if "race" rather
than "need" were the basis for compensatory policies, many
Americans who are not black but who have still suffered disadvantages from social and
economic structures would be excluded. Many inequalities have not come about because
of racial discrimination, but are nonetheless societally
inflicted deprivations over which the victims had no control. Though
there are significant differences between their particular
needs at some levels, especially at the most basic economic level, many Americans
from a wide variety of backgrounds-Indian Americans, Mexican-Americans, rural and
urban white Americans-share an existence in poverty which is at
least in part caused by social forces over which they had no control. Therefore,
according to this argument, though one can distinguish between compensatory
treatment on the basis of "race" and "need," the
latter seems to be the more appropriate criterion
for directing social policy.
William Lee Miller has stated well this
understanding of an expanded notion of society's
obligation to respond to special" needs" created by societally
imposed deprivation in his summary of the changing and developing goals of the
civil rights movement in the twentieth
century:
The first barrier, legal segregation, has been technically overcome; the second barrier, racial dis-
crimination, is being overcome, so far
as law and all sorts of corporate action can do it; we are
coming now to the third barrier-society-made
economic and educational disadvantage." 40
39 For an interesting discussion of the concept of "need," see R. S. Peters, The Concept of Motivation (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1958), pp. 17-18,104-106.
40 William Lee Miller, The Fifteenth Ward and the Great Society (Boston and Cambridge: Houghton
Mifflin Company and the Riverside Press, 1966), p. 186
Thus a strong case
can be made for viewing compensation as a requirement of distributive justice
interpreted in terms of need. Compensatory programs, from this point of view,
are essentially" forward looking." 41 That is, such programs are
designed to alleviate whatever disabilities stand in the way of a person's
securing some future good. It does not really take into account how these
disabilities came about; the real concern is to attend to whatever disabilities
exist so that those who are so afflicted may be brought to the point where they can
compete equally with others in the society. According to this understanding of
compensation, therefore, the history of injustices and exploitation suffered by
black people is not the relevant basis for their compensatory treatment. What is
strictly relevant is that such compensatory
treatment is necessary if some future goods-such as equality
of income, decent living conditions, capacity for
competing for available jobs, quality education, etc.-are to be secured. Or, to
put it
in other words, because there are a multitude of
causes which may bring about special needs, the
present condition of black people could have
been produced by anyone of-or any
combination of-a large number
of these causes. Compensation is intended to
remedy the present situation, however it may have
been produced; and to know the present
situation and how to remedy it
does not necessarily require us
to know exactly how it was brought about,
whether by injustice or some other causes
over which no one had any real control. In terms
of objective need, there
are white as well as black workers who
are almost totally unskilled, white
as well as black youths in need of jobs, white as well as
black
children in need of remedial
education.
Those
who argue for
compensation based on need as a requirement of
distributive justice fail to acknowledge the moral
claim inherent in a demand for reparations.
It is probably true that the
money provided as reparations to black people would not
be adequate to meet the needs of
those who have been deprived or
exploited in the past, even if the sum
were greater than the $500 million or $3 billion proposed by the
spokesmen for the Black Manifesto, so compensatory programs
based on special needs would still be necessary. But compensatory
programs alone cannot meet all the requirements of justice.
41 I have borrowed
the terms "forward looking" and "backward looking" from Bernard Boxill, "The Morality of Reparation," Social Theory and Practice 2 (Spring, 1972), pp, 113-23.
The avowed aim of
compensatory programs is forward
looking, and as such they do not affirm that the benefits they
provide are required
because of a prior injustice: Providing
reparations assumes and requires the acknowledgment
of injustice and the need to set right the wrongs
that have been committed. Put
theologically, repentance is
a necessity for true reconciliation to occur.42 The Black Manifesto
offered those to whom it was addressed an opportunity to acknowledge their
complicity in the history of exploitation and racism, so that by
acknowledging their role in this complex,
historical phenomenon of wrong-
doing they could begin to extricate themselves from it. This is
what compensatory programs based
on need cannot accomplish, and the mistake of Harrington and many churches has
been to try to reduce the one form of compensation to the other.
A CONCLUDING COMMENT
A number of objections to the manifesto could
be raised besides those I have emphasized by focusing initially on the
arguments developed by Harrington and Kaufman.
Objections could be raised about the possibility of
reconciling the mixture of "liberal" and" Marxist" concepts
intermingled in the text of the manifesto. Objections could be raised
concerning the possibility of
establishing mechanisms through which reparations would be administered and
claims adjudicated. Objections could be raised concerning how it would be
possible to calculate an accurate figure for the" unjust enrichment"
of the churches and synagogues. Objections
could be raised about the lack of clarity of the
relationship between the reparations demanded of religious institutions and the
reparations to be demanded of other institutions. I believe a number of these
objections
could be answered if there were space to develop and rebut them carefully, but
the purpose of this essay has not been to provide a full-blown defense of the
Black Manifesto. Rather, it has been to reassert the central argument of the
manifesto in order to demonstrate that justice requires not only a fair
distribution of rights and benefits, but that it also requires reparations when
certain of the most basic rights have been infringed.
Biblical and theological warrants could
be-indeed, in a fully systematic discussion
of the topic ought to be-provided for both distributive and compensatory
justice. The theological traditions of
both Christianity and Judaism, which buttress
the institutions to which the demands of the manifesto were ad-dressed, have a
great deal to say about repairing relationships when someone has been wronged
(compensatory justice) and about providing a fair distribution between persons
(distributive justice).
42 See William Stringfellow, "Reparations: Repentance as a
Necessity to Reconciliation,"
in Black Manifesto: Religion, Racism and Reparations, ed. Lecky and Wright, pp. 52·64.
The two are distinguishable, however, and it is
a
mistake to try to collapse the one into the other; both are necessary if we are
to have a truly just society. There is not space in this essay to delineate the
practical implications of interpreting compensatory justice and reparations as
applicable to women (and
perhaps other minorities) in addition to blacks. The discrimination
that women have experienced is not precisely the same as that which blacks have
suffered.
Nevertheless, the appropriateness of viewing these issues as fundamentally
important for churches and synagogues was stated well by Stephen Rose, who made
one of the clearest and most constructive responses to the manifesto when he
wrote:
Morally
speaking, the case for reparation is clear.
The nation has never provided adequate
recompense to blacks for
the years of slavery and degradation. Nor
has white society been willing to
recognize and repair
the damage it is doing to blacks in the cities. And it is
precisely the missionary
task of the church-as a
leaven-to do what society leaves undone, not in
order to become a substitute for the Government, but
rather to symbolize the way ahead for
the world. 43
By facing
squarely the argument for compensatory justice and reparations, the religious
institutions of America have an opportunity to take a stand against racism,
sexism and exploitation and for a greater realization of the goals of
"liberty" and" equality" in our common life. To provide
an adequate response we need clarity of argument as well as a broader vision of
the good society for which to hope and to work.
43 Stephen C. Rose, "Reparation Now!" Renewal
9 (June, 1969), p. 14.
[1] My concern in this essay is not to
try to summarize all the responses of the various religious organizations to
the manifesto; rather, I shall suggest
that a basic perspective informed almost all of them and that the perspective failed to
accept or even address the argument of the manifesto
on its own grounds. Before moving to that discussion, however, it may be helpful to illustrate the general reaction to the manifesto by selecting some
representative comments.
By and large, Jewish and Catholic organizations rejected the manifesto out of hand. The American Jewish Committee officially withdrew from IFCO because in the committee's opinion I FCO refused to take a "clear stand as to where it stood on the matter of the ideology of the Black Manifesto with its call to guerilla warfare and resort to arms to bring down the government."! The Synagogue Council of America, representing all branches of American Judaism, and the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, composed of most of the Jewish civic and humanitarian organizations, rejected both the substantive demands of the manifesto and the tactics used to present the demands "on both moral and practical grounds.”5 The Rabbinical Council of America, an Orthodox group, rejected the manifesto's demands" categorically," explaining that "just as we have the responsibility to combat white racism, so do we have the equal responsibility to combat black racism which tries-consciously or unconsciously-to perpetuate black racism. "6
The response of the Archdiocese of
New York was typical of---even if more harsh than most-official Roman Catholic reaction to the
manifesto. Its statement rejecting the manifesto emphasized that it was" regrettable"
that the manifesto related its concerns through "political concepts which are completely
contrary to our American way of life,"7 and went on to enumerate the numerous programs the archdiocese
was providing for
poor and black
people. (Commonweal later editorialized that the archdiocese could
surely have done better than to point to its charities and educational expenditures.8)
Responses from Protestant church bodies
were more varied. Almost all rejected the manifesto, but some did so by pointing to already existing programs organized to
combat racism or poverty, whereas others did organize some new programs for black development. The Southern Baptist Convention, though not a direct recipient of manifesto demands, nevertheless approved a statement
condemning the Black Manifesto:
The Council of the American Lutheran Church was almost as vehement in its
rejection, objecting to the manifesto's “strong, course, inflammatory language;”10 but it promised to begin an aggressive
program to focus on racism and poverty.
The closest any Protestant
national body came to endorsing the
manifesto was the statement issued by the General Board of the National Council of Churches, which is not, of course, a denomination but an agency serving its member churches. The Board, while "rejecting the ideology of the Black Manifesto,"
declared that it was" aware of the grievances of the
black people of this nation" and "acknowledges the Black
Economic Development Conference as a
programmatic expression of the aspirations of black churchmen." The Board also voted to ask its 33 member denominations to raise $500 million and to give it,
without condition as to its use, to NCBC and IFCO.12
Although many individual
churchmen (especially black church-men), a Catholic group of lay people,
several ad hoc groups and at least one congregation endorsed the demand
for reparations as a just means for compensating blacks for
discrimination inflicted in the past,13 almost all the churches-especially at
official or national denominational levels-rejected the idea of reparations as
an appropriate moral justification for providing remedies to combat racism or
poverty afflicting black people. Before I attempt to make
9 Christian Century 86 (July 16,1969), p. 961.
10 Christian Century 87 (February
11,1970), p. 186.
11 Christian Century 86
(October I, 1969), pp. 1262-64. For
additional accounts of the response
of the Episcopal Church see Judy M. Foley, "Dealing with a Manifesto," The Episcopalian 134
(July, 1969), pp. 11-12, and David Owen,
"A Tale of Two Conferences-Part II," Renewal 9 (September-October, 1969), pp. 20-21.
12 Christian Century 86 (October
1,1969), p. 1239.
13 Christian Century 87
(February 11, 1970), pp. 186-88; New York Times, July 7, 1969, p. 18;
New York Times, June 10, 1970, pp. 49, 74.
some generalizations about the responses of the churches, however, it might be appropriate to
reconstruct the argument of the manifesto, for it is the merits of that
argument which must be appraised if we are going to attempt to view the
manifesto as having more than momentary significance.
THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT
OF THE MANIFESTO
It is clear to any reader
of the manifesto that its central argument is not easy to separate from the more
peripheral issues in the document. The argument is intertwined with revolutionary rhetoric, remarks expressing
passionate indignation, posturing threats to the white community, generalized predictions about the future of America and the world and a
brief sketch of how the reparation monies would be used once they are secured,
Therefore, it is necessary to concentrate on some of the most essential points
in order not to be confused or distracted from the basic ethical argument
justifying reparations to black people, The reconstructed argument below contains some premises drawn directly from the text of the manifesto-either 'as precise
quotations or paraphrases-and some premises which are interpolations of what
seem to be the tacit assumptions underlying some of the explicit assertions in
the text of the
document.14
l. In the early history of
slavery, blacks were wrenched from a" continent of peace" and brought
into" a hostile and alien environment" where they" have been
living in perpetual warfare since 1619" (p. 119),
2. The result has been
that blacks have suffered enormously" from racism and exploitation, cultural degradation and lack of
political power," all of which was caused by and is perpetuated by the
white capitalistic power structure (pp. 114, 116-17).